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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will focus on legal transplants by elaborating legal transplants theories and 
their motives, and will apply them to labour law. More specifically, it will apply them 
to the creation of employment relationship in Montenegro, a reform process that has 
been in place in the country in recent years (as in other countries in the Balkan region) 
and involves both legislative and institutional change.  
There is no overall accepted definition for many legal terms in labour law, as their 
definitions often depend on the national system. This, however, is a well-known issue 
in comparative law, which recognizes “legal translation and…the role of 
language…necessarily at the heart of comparative law”.1  
In this thesis I will follow the interpretation of scholars such as Freedland and 
Kountouris and consider labour law and employment law to be synonyms.2  
More specifically, this thesis takes into account the fact, relatively well known among 
scholars and also in politics, that during legislative reforms countries use comparative 
legal experiences and practices from legal systems that are either similar to their own 
legal system or to the legal system they wish to imitate.3 Often, this process includes 
the translation of the text of the law from the country of origin or a supranational legal 
system and the direct transposition of the translated text in the recipient’s country.  
                                                          
1 M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2011, p. 57. 
2 Ivi., p. 15. Freedland  and Kountouris consider labour law and employment law as synonims in 
European and English legal context, however for the purpose of clarity I will consider them as such for 
any given legal system,  in this thesis.  
3 R. Sacco, “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment II of II)”, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 39, 1991, p. 399.  1-34 and 343-401, p.400. 
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However, as Nelken noted, what is often overlooked is that during the process of 
political transition, many actors engaged in the process of law reform and legal 
borrowing borrow from legal systems that come from quite different traditions 
compared to their own.4 In this thesis I ultimately wish to explore what the results are 
when borrowing from rules and experiences that come from quite the opposite legal 
system.  
This thesis will argue that when a country’s current legal and political system collapses, 
in the case in which the legal system is closely connected to the political system of the 
country itself, the country in question does not necessarily adopt the legal experiences 
of countries with legal and political systems similar to the one that collapsed. This 
process of modernization will involve the transplant of legal norms of other legal 
systems, not necessarily of those with the highest degree of complementarity with the 
pre-existing legal system. Not only will the legal institutional system change through 
legal borrowing, but the legal borrowing will have as a consequence a new political, 
legal and economic system in the country as well. Hence, the country will be unlikely 
to innovate in legal rules; rather, it may try to catch up with already-existing successful 
(prestigious) legal rules and models.  
According to Sacco,  
A country that has created a rule or institution that others borrow may have an 
innovative capacity which will lead it to replace this rule or institution by 
another. If the original rule or institution has been borrowed in the meantime by 
                                                          
4 D. Nelken, “The meaning of success in transnational legal transfers”, Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice, vol. 19 ,2001, 349-66. 
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other countries, these countries may preserve it longer than the country of its 
origin.5 
The starting point of this thesis is that law is “a product of human interaction”6 and not 
a “politically neutral endowment”.7 
In order to carry out this research, I will apply a certain type of classification of legal 
systems, and in this I will be guided by the thought according to which “no taxonomy 
of legal systems can claim universality by serving every comparative purpose better 
that every alternative one”.8 Besides, the “classical” mapping of legal systems, which 
distinguishes between civil and common law legal systems and is almost unavoidable 
in today’s comparative and legal discussions, appears to be superficial. However, the 
classification “common/civil law” will still be used in this thesis, since avoiding it 
would require elaborating specifically and only on this issue, but the limitations of this 
simplification should be always kept in mind.  
As Milhaup and Pistor note,  
…more important than these formal characteristics are the incentives a given 
legal system generates to invest in innovation and adaptation of governance 
over time and the way this process is influenced by access to the legal system 
and the law making and law enforcement stages.…Once we look beyond the 
caricature of civil law and common law and analyze the way legal systems are 
organized, we find configurations that are more varied….9 
 
For the purpose of this thesis and my own thinking about legal family’s influence on 
legal borrowing, the taxonomy proposed by Mattei, based on the rule of law as a tool 
                                                          
5 Sacco, op. cit., p. 399.  
6 C. Milhaupt and K. Pistor, Law & Capitalism, The University of Chicago Press, United States of 
America, 2008, p. 22. 
7 Ibid.  
8 U. Mattei, “Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems”, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 45, 1997, p. 8. 
9 Milhaupt and Pistor, op.cit., p. 30. 
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for social organization in the Weberian sense10, has been more than useful, as it has 
provided me with food for thought on different challenges with which the law in a 
specific country is faced.11 According to Mattei, in all societies there are some main 
sources of social norms that can affect our behaviour: “politics, law and philosophical 
or religious traditions, all together”.12  
As a small digression, it should be noted that, rather similarly to this, Djankov et al. 
argue that a legal system’s creation and design is in direct correlation to the political 
system.13 What Djankov et al. describe as “conflict between the twin goals of 
controlling disorder and dictatorship”14 means that “any system faces the challenge of 
designing institutions that effectively protect property rights and creating a strong state 
capable of enforcing property rights, while constraining the temptation of a strong state 
to infringe on these very rights”.15  
Mattei states that politics, law and tradition as sources of social norms can be seen at 
play in all legal system with some variations, affecting the human behaviour, and can 
help us with the legal system’s taxonomy.16 He proposes the following patterns of legal 
systems: rule of professional law, rule of political law and rule of traditional law.17 
According to Mattei: “In each legal system, or family of legal systems, all three 
patterns can be seen at play. What changes is the outcome of the competition among 
                                                          
10 Mattei, op. cit., p. 12. 
11 Mattei, op. cit., p. 12. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Milhaupt and Pistor, op. cit.  
14 S. Djankov, E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, “The New Comparative 
Economics”, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.34, 2003, p. 597. 
15 Milhaupt and Pistor, op. cit., p. 37. 
16 Mattei, op. cit., p.13. 
17 Ivi., p. 16. 
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three.”18 Mattei suggests that eventually legal systems can be grouped in families 
according to the domination of these patterns, leaving the other remaining two patterns 
to “play a larger or smaller role depending on the scope of the alternative forms of 
social control left by the hegemonic pattern. Occasionally, non-hegemonic patterns will 
determine certain legal outcomes in an unofficial, cryptic way, regardless of any 
official reason”.19 Nevertheless, I noted that what often makes a transition or change 
slow is the conflict between these patterns within a given system.  
In order to perform this research and write this thesis, I also had to elaborate on the 
concept of comparative law. Rabel was the first researcher to explain that the two 
concepts of functionalism and context are key in order to understand comparative law. 
As described by Glendon et al., what he meant was that “You cannot compare legal 
rules, institutions, or systems without knowing how they function, and you cannot 
know how they function without situating them in their legal economic and cultural 
context.”20  
As times change, sometimes the rules applicable to a given legal system also change. 
As Sacco noted, before the Second World War, legislators in socialist countries did not 
approve the comparison between socialist and bourgeois law, as these were two 
opposites.21 However, Sacco stresses that certain legal rules and values, such as the 
disapproval of homicide, for example, can survive a change in the material basis of 
                                                          
18 Mattei, op. cit., p.1 4. 
19Ibid. 
20 M. Glendon, P. G. Carozza, C. B. Picker, Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell, St. Paul: 
Thompson/West, United States of America, 2008, p. 9. 
21 Sacco, op. cit., p. 6. 
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society.22 He notes that after the Second World War, both types of societies have 
shared public international law and signed international conventions that are the same 
for all parties. Thus, according to Sacco, the jurists who at first denied the possibility of 
comparison between socialist and capitalist systems, while explaining the reasons for 
this denial, were themselves making a comparison without realizing it. 23 
Finally, in this thesis I will use the case study of Montenegro to examine the creation of 
employment relationships. Montenegro is a particularly interesting case due to the fact 
that in the last one hundred years it has experienced very different transitions in its 
legal system. Before the Second World War, the country was organized by typical 
European civil law labour relations, in which the contract of employment emerged as a 
regulator, as well as by employment relations. However instead of developing as the 
rest of Western Europe did, the political changes that occurred after the Second World 
War created a self-governing socioeconomic type of society, which led to the abolition 
of the institution of contracts of employment. This would again change in 1990s, when 
the country experienced a transition towards a free market-based economy. It will be 
interesting to see how the employment relationship evolved within these different 
contexts, and to determine the differences between the types of employment 
relationships in two political and legal systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Ivi, p. 7.  
23 Sacco, op. cit., p. 7.  
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Thesis structure 
 
The first chapter of this thesis will provide the reader with an overview of the literature 
on the topic of legal transplants and will introduce the different theoretical frameworks 
and reasoning on this topic throughout the course of history. It will demonstrate how 
this literature is quite divided in its opinion on legal transplants and will highlight the 
reasons for this.  
The second chapter will introduce the concept of comparative labour law and legal 
transplants in labour law. We will notice that labour law reform is tightly connected 
with labour markets and thus with theories of economics and law and economics as 
well. That is why one part of this chapter is devoted to theories on law and economics 
and the influence of international financial institutions on labour markets. I will present 
the work of Sir Otto Kahn Freund, who is considered the father of English labour law 
and whose writings on the compatibility of law and practice were also useful for the 
case study on Montenegro. Finally, in the second chapter I will present the work of the 
International Labour Organization, as the influence of this organization’s standards-
setting and technical work is of utmost importance for the development of modern 
labour law and working conditions around the world. 
The third chapter will examine the creation of the employment relationship and the 
emergence of the contract of employment. In this chapter I will also present the case 
study on Montenegro, where the contract of employment relationship, in the form we 
have today, did not exist until the 1990s. The case study will analyse how the processes 
13 
 
of transition, which have involved both legal and institutional reform, affected the 
creation of the employment relationship. The case study analysis will necessarily start 
by considering the roots of the Montenegrin legal system, focusing specifically on the 
transition from the emergence of some form of the contract of employment in 1910 and 
then its marginalization in the 1950s during the socialist self-governing political system 
to the new democratic-based national constitution 1990s. It will hence investigate how 
the country has been able (or not) to introduce a new type of regulation of the 
employment relationship through the contract of employment and legal borrowing.  
The thesis will operate both synchronically and diachronically in the process of 
comparison: it will not only use a comparison between the legal system and the 
transplants made as they stand today, but will also provide an historical perspective on 
the process of change that affected the original Yugoslavian legal system. 
The relevance of this thesis becomes evident when one recognizes that the economic 
and legislative development and the process of integration within the European Union 
that Montenegro aims to achieve in the following years can only be effective if the 
development also involves the transformation of laws and legal institutions. Martin 
Upchurch, professor of International Employment Relations at Middlesex University 
Business School, London, and author of a number of articles on labour issues in 
Yugoslavia, stated: 
The states of Central and Eastern Europe have accumulated almost sixteen years 
of experience, whereas the new states of former Yugoslavia have been 
relativenew-comers to the stage. The country is, in many ways, a special case 
within the transformation story, having opened up the economy in late 1960s 
under Tito regime, to foreign direct investment, only for transformation to be 
stalled in the 1980s and the ensuring period of war. Self-management was a 
14 
 
particularized form of enterprise governance which may also have left a 
footprint for future developments in industrial relations.24 
 
I will argue that, although labour law can act as a developmental institution, for it to 
play this role it must be sensitive to conditions in the local environment. Thus, the 
effectiveness of labour law rules in practice will be dependent on the level of 
development of the country concerned, and in particular on the nature of other 
complementary institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 M. Upchurch, “Strategic dilemmas for trade Unions in transformation: the experience of Serbia”, 
SEER-South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs, vol. 04, 2006, pp 43-64. 
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Chapter I LEGAL TRANSPLANTS  
1.1 Reasons behind legal transplants  
Some scholars agree that in labour law, borrowing legal rules has become an accepted 
modus operandi when it comes to labour law reform.25 Being “inspired” by best legal 
practices has become a common technique when it comes to legal and institutional 
reforms, not only in the domain of labour law but in any part of the law.26Also because 
of this, much has been written about the use of comparative law in the process of law 
reform.27  
From the literature, it appears that the main purpose of what is called a “legal 
transplant” is reforming the law through legislation or through policy choices, which 
ultimately affect legal institutional settings.28 It is also suggested that any system that 
borrows legal rules does so because it is believed that there is a failure of its own 
system or that there is a need to follow what may be called a civilizational trend, factor 
of globalization, market need, requirement for becoming a member of an exclusive 
club—the list can be exhaustive. As Sacco wrote, “A legal system will borrow when 
it’s incomplete. An incomplete system will tend to imitate just to fill the gaps.”29  
                                                          
25 More information can be found in R. Blanpain „Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations“ in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market Economies, 
Roger Blanpain (ed), Kluwer Law International, Great Britain, vol. I, 1990. 
26 This technique is used by the governments, international organizations or private experst when 
advising on the law reform.  
27 J. H. M. Van Erp, „The Use of Comparative Law in the Legislative Process“, in Netherlands Reports 
to the 15th International Congress of Comparative Law, E. H. Hondius (ed), Bristol, 1998.  
28 As it will be noticed from the literature overview bellow.  
29 Sacco, op. cit., p. 400.  
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1.2 Situations in which legal transplants occur  
In the case of legal borrowing, I can think of some situations that may arise with regard 
to three patterns: the legal institutional system, the political system and the economic 
system. The situation in which legal borrowing has as a consequence new political, 
economic and legal institutional systems in a country is applicable to the case of 
Montenegro.  
Countries often borrow legal rules from the countries with which they have similar 
legal traditions.30 However, this is not always the case with countries whose current 
legal and political systems have failed—also applicable to the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, what should be noted is that legal borrowing is almost never 
limited only to borrowing from only one legal model or system, unless that is, for 
example, a political requirement. 
As demonstrated below, many legal scholars have contributed to the literature on legal 
transplants and have tried to define this trend from political, legal, sociological and 
anthropological points of view. Legal transplants theory became well known when it 
was described and introduced by Alan Watson in his book Legal Transplants: An 
Approach to Comparative Law, in 1974.   
Nevertheless, studies on the reception and diffusion of law in the history of legal-
sociological-anthropological scholarship have been conducted since long before 
Watson published his work on legal transplants; among the scholars who have studied 
                                                          
30 H. Xanthaki, “Legal transplants in legislation: Diffusing the trap”, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, vol. 57, 2008, p. 660.  
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this are Jeremy Bentham, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de 
Montesquieu, Gabriel Tarde, Sir Henry Maine, and Max Weber, among others. This is 
also because the question of transferability of law from one system to another is, among 
other things, one of the central questions in comparative law.31  
Scholars who research this topic, like William Twining, observe that today, as during 
the course of history, legal borrowings may symbolize the (colonial) power of laws of 
some states over others.32 Similarly, Paul Koschaker has argued that the transposition 
or transplant of law in fact represents the power and prestige of some countries over 
others. In this regard, Koshaker observed that the reception of Roman law and the Code 
Napoleon occurred as a consequence of imperial power and not because these laws 
were superior in their quality.33 Besides, as noted by Graziadei, “Legal transplants are 
surely of interest to those who are interested in the study of relations of power, such as 
those arising through colonization (and the fate of transplants tells us much about the 
postcolonial landscape).”34   
In fact, the word “transplant”, in its earliest use from 1440, according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, was used in a farming context, while in the 1600s it became the 
“term of art to denote ‘colony’”.35 
Historically, Montesquieu discussed the reception of Roman law in medieval Europe 
by considering the differences in local conditions and imported law,36 finding that the 
                                                          
31 This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the topic has been researched by many comparativists.  
32 W. Twining, “Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective”, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, Vol. 36, Issue 49, 2004, pp. 1-45. 
33 Ivi, p. 9.  
34 M. Graziadei, „Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge“, Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law, vol. 10:639, 2009, p. 694. 
35 A. Huxley, “Jeremy Bentham on Legal Transplants”, Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 2, 2007, 
p.182. 
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main problem with the transplantation of legal rules was differences in government, 
geography and culture.37 Montesquieu observed that,  
[The political and civil laws of each nation] should be so closely tailored to the 
people for whom they are made, that it would be pure chance [un grand hazard] 
if the laws of one nation could meet the needs of another....They should be 
relative to the geography of the country; to its climate, whether cold or tropical 
or temperate; to the quality of the land, its situation, and its extent; to the form 
of life of the people, whether farmers, hunters, or shepherds; they should be 
relative to the degree of liberty that the constitution can tolerate; to the religion 
of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, wealth, number, commerce, customs, 
manners.38 
 
In this sense, Montesquieu was the first scholar to look at the spirit of the law, and not 
only at formal legal rules, which are separated from the cultural, geographical and 
institutional scopes in which they operate. In his opinion, only in the most unique cases 
could the transfer of legal norms and institutions from one country to another be 
successful. As explained in the second chapter of this thesis, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund asks 
himself whether Montesquieu would, in the time of globalization, write the same. 
In reference to globalization, another scholar who wrote about reasons for legal 
borrowing is Mattei, who noted that in the globalized world, we must allow legal 
systems to learn from each other. Therefore, transfers of knowledge on legal regulation 
and traditions, among other things, are needed not only “within different areas of a 
given legal system, but also among different legal systems.”39 
                                                                                                                                                                         
36 Graziadei, op. cit., p. 696. 
37 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748, trans. T. Nugent and J.V. 
Pritchard, London, 1914. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Mattei, op. cit., p. 6. 
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According to Mattei, intellectual globalization has as a consequence the fact that 
different views in the world of law clash with each other.40 If we apply this to legal 
transplants, they will be successful only if their place of origin has a legal framework 
compatible with the adopting country’s framework.41 However, if we deal with “legal 
imperialism”, then in this case, according to Nelken, “the transfers of knowledge rather 
than being a pattern of communication and exchange between different legal systems, 
becomes a one-sided exportation of legal rules and concepts that usually end up being 
rejected, or creating intellectual dependency.”42  
Nelken wrote that in the present situation, unhappiness with the result of legal transfer 
is often encountered in countries that seek to resist to the globalization trend,43 because 
“globalization has palpably affected the supply and demand for law in many countries 
and highlighted the fact that law has different functions in different countries.”44 
Scholars such as Mattei have written about and elaborated on the path dependency of 
law: “Since comparison involves history, by means of comparative study, it is possible 
to identify the deep differences in the path of legal systems that make that dependency 
occur.”45 Path dependence, in this regard, refers to the environment in which the law 
operates and the way the law and the environment are shaped. Therefore, the law is 
“path dependent” on the environment that creates the “climate” and the realities of the 
path itself. According to Mattei, due to the path dependency phenomenon, we can 
                                                          
40 Ivi, p.7. 
41Ibid. 
42Ibid. 
43 Nelken, op. cit., p.350 and p.351.  
44 Milhaupt and Pistor, op. cit., p. 45.  
45  Mattei, op. cit., p. 6.  
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predict the failure or success of legal transplants: he observed that “path dependency 
seems to be what determines the success or failure of a legal transplant”.46  
Similar to Legrand and Montesque, Mattei does not consider law to be made out of 
legal rules in a technical sense. The law, according to him, cannot be deprived of 
cultural, historical and anthropological heritage. However, according to Mattei this 
does not mean that common elements to legal systems and laws cannot be found—on 
the contrary, taxonomy, which “reflects the legal culture”,47 is the foundation to 
proposals of - what Mattei calls- “principled solutions” in law, and it helps lawyers 
from different legal systems to find a common language.48 Consequently, the careful 
study of the path dependence and the correct taxonomy could perhaps predict the 
success or failure of the legal transplant, according to Mattei.   
It should also be noted that legal borrowing, as stated previously, is rarely based on or 
influenced by only one legal system:  
Modern Japanese law, for example, is as much influenced by American legal 
culture as by German or French. The new Dutch Civil Code is filled with rules 
borrowed from France, Germany, and the Common Law. The same may be said 
of Israel, Italy, and even England since its law has entered its new European 
dimension.49  
Furthermore, borrowing could be a matter of prestige, not only of a legal system but 
also of its particular parts. Thus, what should also be taken into consideration is “the 
prestige of the legal culture of certain portions of a particular legal system”.50 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Ivi, p. 5.  
48 Ibid. 
49 U. Mattei, “Efficiency in Legal Transplants: an Essay in Comparative Law and Economics”, 
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1994, p.4. 
50 Sacco, op. cit.   
21 
 
The theories on the reception of law have been also closely linked to the theory of 
diffusion in cultural anthropology, in which “diffusionism represented a reaction 
against the prevailing nineteenth century view that there were natural laws of evolution 
governing human progress”.51 According to Twining, diffusion of law occurs when one 
legal system is considerably influenced by another and the definition of “influence” in 
this case is regarded as one kind of “interlegality”.52 In his work on diffusionism in law, 
Twining developed a “model of reception that has twelve elements, none of which are 
necessary and some of which are not even characteristic of most processes of 
diffusion”.53 He presents his model as follows:  
[A] bipolar relationship between two countries involving a direct one way 
transfer of legal rules or institutions through the agency of governments 
involving formal enactment or adoption at a particular moment of time (a 
reception date) without major change….[I]t is commonly assumed that the 
standard case involves transfer from an advanced (parent) civil or common law 
system to a less developed one, in order to bring about technological change 
(“to modernise”) by filling in gaps or replacing prior local law.54 
 
As the opposite to legal imperialism, which was mentioned previously, some scholars 
have written about voluntary reception of law, which occurred, as Twining mentions, in 
Turkey, Japan and to some degree Ethiopia.55 Voluntary legal transplants in Turkey 
happened partially as a consequence of the prestige of certain legal systems, and are 
described by Turkish scholar Esin Örücü. As she explains, in the case of Turkey, 
voluntary legal transplants have their basis in the theory of competing legal systems, 
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supported by a large number of scholars dealing with law and economics and 
economics in general. Örücü states that “What is regarded today as the theory of 
‘competing legal systems’,56 albeit used mainly in the rhetoric of ‘law and economics’ 
analysis, was the basis of the reception of laws that formed the Turkish legal system in 
the years 1924 - 1930. The various Codes were chosen from what were seen to be ‘the 
best’ in their field for various reasons”.57  
Accroding to Örücü, no single legal system represented a model. Instead, the deciding 
factors were efficiency, prestige or chance: “it was instead the civil law, the law of 
obligations and civil procedure from Switzerland, commercial law, maritime law and 
criminal procedure from Germany, criminal law from Italy and administrative law from 
France that were chosen, translated, adapted and adjusted to solve the social and legal 
problems of Turkey and to fit together”.58  
But what is the essential condition without which there is no voluntarism in legal 
borrowing? According to Örücü, the element that must exist in this context is choice. 
As she states, “Choice means taking one option as opposed to another, and the 
existence of choice is what differentiates a reception from an imposition. Thus, the 
difference between reception and imposition is related to the existence or absence of 
choice. On this criterion alone, the Turkish experience is a substantial and thorough 
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experience in ‘reception’”.59 Örücü further observes that in the case Turkey, the country 
has been given complete freedom and voluntary expression in choosing the rules that 
will govern its legal system, which will then shape the economic system and 
institutions of the country.  
1.3 Overview of the literature on legal transplants 
1.3.1 Legal Transplants: Alan Watson  
Much of the debate in the literature on legal transplants was triggered by the work of 
Alan Watson, and in particular by his book Legal Transplants: An Approach to 
Comparative Law, published in 1974. I will try to introduce his work on this topic here.  
Watson, an English scholar and an expert in the history of law, believes that the 
following factors determine a legal system: the existing sources of law, legal 
borrowing, the nature of legal processes adopted, and the combination of these three 
factors.60 In contrast to the view expressed in this thesis, Watson believes that politics 
does not affect the classification of legal systems: “the nature of the government, 
whether democratic or tyrannous, does not affect the classification of legal system”.61 It 
should be also noted that Watson considers that among Western legal traditions the 
division among civil and common law is properly done, but then he also applies this 
classification to other non-Western legal systems, considering them systems under 
Western legal influence. The reason behind is that Watson consideres a civil law 
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system one in which “parts or the whole of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis...have been 
in the past or are at present treated as the law of the land, or at very last, are of direct 
and highly persuasive force...Common law systems are those that have a dependancy 
on English law”.62  
Watson states that the borrowing of legal rules happens in the form of legal transplants, 
by “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one 
people to another.”63 Thus, as Galindo observed, according to Watson movement is the 
main characteristic of a legal transplant, which is “essentially linked to legal 
development”.64 He further considers that legal rules, principles, institutions and 
structures can always be subject to legal borrowing.65 In fact, legal transplants, 
according to him, explain the growth of law,66 and “most changes in most systems are 
the result of borrowing”.67  Watson maintains that legal systems can relate to each other 
because of legal borrowing.68  
Watson considers the law as “the intellectual creation of clever lawyers, easily 
adaptable to local use by other clever lawyers elsewhere on the globe”.69 According to 
him, lawyers are an elite law-making group in society, and there are certain habits that 
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are common to all lawyers in all legal systems. One of these habits is borrowing legal 
rules from more prestigious legal systems.70  
Watson’s work on legal transplants is based on legal history, including comparative 
legal history. One of his first works published on this topic, 1977’s Society and Legal 
Change, highlights the idea of legal change based on legal transplants:  he observes that 
“at most times, in most places, borrowing from a different jurisdiction has been a 
principle way in which law has developed”.71 According to Watson,  
Comparative Law, then, if it is to be an intellectual discipline in its own right, is 
something other than the study of one foreign system (with glances at one’s 
own), and overall look at the world’s systems or comparison of individual rules 
or of branches of law as between two or more systems, and I would suggest that 
it is the study of the relationship of one legal system and its rules with another. 
The nature of any such relationship, the reasons for the similarities and the 
differences, is discoverable only by a study of the history of the systems or of 
the rules; hence in the first place, Comparative Law is Legal History concerned 
with the relationship between systems.72  
 
Watson states that borrowing is the principle mechanism through which Western legal 
systems have developed, and the central theme in comparative law should be the theory 
of legal transplants.73 He observes that “the moving of a rule or a system of law from 
one country to another has been shown to be the most fertile source of legal 
development since most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing.”74 
In support of his thesis on legal transplants, he uses examples from the diffusion of 
Roman law, following the movement and reception of Roman legal rules throughout 
                                                          
70 Ewald, op. cit., p. 499. 
71 Watson, Society and Legal Change, op. cit. p.98. 
72 Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, op. cit.  
73 Watson, Society and Legal Change, op. cit. 
74 Alan Watson, „Legal Transplants and Law Reform“, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 94, 1976, p. 92. 
26 
 
continental Europe.75 He states that: “The mobility of Roman law is geographical as 
well as historical; Roman-based systems are now at home in icy Quebec, tropical 
Panama, sunny South Africa, as well as in most of Western continental Europe - in 
water-filled low-lying Holland, arid mountainous Spain, and in industrial West 
Germany as previously in pastoral Prussia.”76  
As noted above, Watson considers that the civil law system was created with the 
acceptance of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis: “After the initial acceptance, everything 
else, including the dominant role of the universities in shaping legal thought, would 
follow. For this process, once started, to be explicable, no reference need be made to 
further societal factors, including the general political structure or the organization of 
practicing lawyers”.77 
According to Watson, since rules can be reduced to writing, they can also be easily 
physically transported from one place to another.78 And in fact, as we will see later, the 
way Watson treats legal rules is one of the main points of disagreement between him 
and other scholars. In  his perspective, little importance is given to the changes of legal 
rules on their path and any possible transformation that may occur in the transplant 
process.  
Watson also provides examples of modern legal transplants occurring at the 
international level, which lead to the creation of transnational legal systems. In this 
regard, he writes about the international sale of goods, which was fostered by the 
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creation of a uniform contract law and by the 1988 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. As this UN convention came into force in 
many countries, Watson considers this an example of a transplant that shows how 
foreign law can be accepted and implemented in many different countries. He points 
out the importance of avoiding the domestic proceedings that would transform this 
convention into domestic law.79 
Although many legal scholars considered the unification of European private law 
extremely challenging, according to Watson, on the contrary, the drafting of a single 
code of private law for the European Union would be “technically easy, despite 
political difficulties”.80 In fact, he considers that the act of borrowing is simple, while 
instead building the theory of borrowing is rather complicated.81 In addition, for 
Watson, “legal rules may be successfully borrowed where the relevant social, 
economic, geographical and political circumstances of the recipient are very different 
from those of the donor system”.82  
According to Watson, there are many reasons why the borrowing of legal rules occurs. 
One of them is due to extreme practical utility. It is economically efficient to borrow 
legal rules, as it facilitates the work of lawmakers.83 The second reason is because the 
borrowing happens by chance, by something unpredictable, and hence “the power of 
mistake must also not be overlooked”.84 He also elaborates on the prestige of laws: 
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“When foreign law is given high authority, then when new situations arise, jurists may 
not find it easy to develop new laws on the basis of irrelevant or even non-existent 
sources”.85  
Watson introduces the need for authority as a reason for legal borrowing, and many of 
the examples he provides are based on the spread of Roman law and its reception in 
relation to the notion of authority. He believes that legal education is a big factor in 
legal borrowing, as it shapes legal attitudes86: “Southern African students educated in 
law at Edinburgh imported to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland some Scots law. A 
decline in Latinity means that, no matter the attachment to Roman law and Roman- 
Dutch law in South Africa, the usefulness of the sources is less in the absence of 
translations”.87 
However, on the effects of transplanted rules, Watson argues that a legal rule, once 
borrowed from a certain legal system, does not necessarily have the same effect in the 
destination country. According to him, only legal rules are to be transplanted, not the 
spirit of a legal system. Therefore, the “transplanting of legal rules is socially easy”. 88 
There are many critiques of Watson’s theory, and one of the main ones, as put forward 
by relevant scholars in this field, consists of the consideration that legal rules cannot be 
separated from culture, history, tradition and politics, which contribute to their creation 
and enforcement.  
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1.3.2 The Ruleness of the Rule: Pierre Legrand  
Pierre Legrand, described by some scholars as a cultural pessimist,89 wrote the 
following: “It is enough for me to say that legal cultures and the diversity of forms of 
life-in-the-law they embody, remain the expression of the human capacity for choice 
and self-creation and, as such, deserve to be respected as incorporating a vital aspect of 
social existence which helps to define selfhood”.90  
Legrand defends what he defines as the ideal notion of comparativism from legal 
imperialism, by promoting and trying to preserve the idea of diversity of law and legal 
cultures, since the “legal is necessarily informed by the cultural”.91 Legrand uses the 
term “cultural” in relation to law, but he does so in a form that is suitable for legal 
administration; hence, when courts interpret different understandings, they do so 
through the lens of the legal system in which they take part, and this shapes their 
interpretations so as to make them serve the purpose of the given legal system.92  
Thus the difference among laws and legal systems absolutely exists, but in deciding 
what we can make of this diversity, according to Legrand, one makes the decision of 
paying or not paying attention to cultural explanation.93 Considering that rules as such 
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only provide us with a superficial image of a legal system, Legrand notes that on the 
other hand culture  
concerns frameworks of intangibles within which interpretive communities 
operate and which have normative force for these communities. It occupies a 
middle ground between what is common to all human beings (if, indeed, there 
be such commonality) and what is unique to each individual. Culture refers to 
features that are not universal but that transcend the individual.94  
 
According to Legrand, if a set of rules can be established for global usage, irrespective 
of the legal, political and economic context in which they are to be applied,95 
comparativism and imperialism must become linked, as “the repression is implemented 
in favour of an institutionalized doctrine that claims to speak all at once and once for 
all”.96 Therefore Legrand notes that if we proclaim the “bestness”, “correctness” or 
”truthfulness” 97 of only one legal system or set of rules, we inevitably deny any other 
law, including local law, and we recognize only “beyond-any-law”.98 
Thus, if there exists such a thing as the best legal system, this would imply that this 
system is the “truth in the law” system. Consequently, this would mean that the law 
could be objective,99 because the truth in law and the best law of all laws could be 
created only if complete and full objectiveness is reached with no external influences, 
including unconscious cultural influences on the side of the drafter of the text. 
According to Legrand, however, it is impossible for law to be objective, as he states 
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that even “the rules that the European Community and the member States present to 
their respective constituencies similarly capture a legal culture. These rules are not 
simple reflections of some natural order. Rather, they are produced by human agency 
through institutional structures and legal processes”.100 
Therefore, according to Legrand, law is subjective. There cannot be a better law, and 
while there can be a certain understanding of law, no understanding is universal or can 
“capture the law as it is”.101 “The only sense in which there will be a ‘better’ law is in 
the way some interpretations favouring one particular law will prove more convincing 
than others within the community of inquirers to which they are addressed”.102  
In his analysis of legal transplants, Legrands asks himself what has been displaced in 
the case of legal transplant, the “law” or the “legal”.103 He observed,  
Because rules are but the outward manifestation of an implicit structure of 
attitude and reference, they are a reflection of a given legal culture. This is true 
of all rules, even the most innocuous ones. This is, therefore, also true of what 
one can refer to as “meta-rules”, that is, the rules developed by a legal system 
(or, more accurately, by the actors within a legal system) in order to help it 
manage its body of rules.104 
 
What Watson considers the “moving of the rule from one country to another” is 
supported by the formalist understanding of law, according to which the rules (statutory 
rules and judicial decisions) are the principal meaning of the “legal”. If, for Watson, 
transplanting legal rules is socially easy, then this, according to Legrand, means that the 
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law is neither based on nor related to social, cultural and historical circumstances, but 
rather represents only a function of rules, isolated from society.105 However, according 
to Legrand, such a position does not represent legal rules. Rules, as they really are, 
cannot be separated from their meaning, which in reality represents their essential 
component—the component that constitutes the “ruleness” of the rule.106 The meaning 
of the rule represents the “function of the application of the rule by its interpreter”,107 
and it is based on the interpreter’s assumptions, which again cannot be independent 
from the historical and cultural background within which they operate.108  
Thus, the interpretation of the rule is a subjective act, which is conditioned by the 
cultural environment and the broader environment in general. This subjectivity is 
influenced by the subjectivity of everyone with whom the interpreter interacts from the 
circle of the interpretive community, as they have their own subjectivity in making the 
interpretation.109  
Legrand also observes that there is not only one interpretation of a rule; different 
interpretations exist within one system and they compete, making the winning 
interpretation the result of power struggles. According to Legrand, “As the 
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understanding of the rule changes, the meaning of the rule changes. And as the 
meaning of the rule changes, the rule itself changes”.110  
Therefore, if we transport a rule from one system to another, we are transporting only a 
set of words, not their meaning, as the meaning is created in a particular cultural, 
historical and social environment through their interpretation, which is influenced by 
the subjectivity of the interpreters. This, again, is influenced by the subjectivity of 
different interpretations within the society, and comes out as the result of different 
power struggles. This process is unique only for that given system and society.  
Hence, even if we transplant a rule as a set of words in the process of legal reform, the 
meaning, or the ruleness of the rule, cannot be transplanted. “Assuming a common 
language, the position is as follows: there was one rule (inscribed words a + meaning 
x), and there is now a second rule elsewhere (inscribed words a + meaning y). It is not 
the same rule”.111 Rules alone, as also stated above, according to Legrand, “actually tell 
one very little about a given legal system and reveal even less about whether two legal 
systems are converging or not. They may provide one with much information about 
what is apparently happening, but they indicate nothing about the deep structures of 
legal systems”.112 Therefore, Legrand writes that what can be transported from one 
jurisdiction to another is only “meaningless form of words”,113 unless a rule may exist 
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in “solitary state” carrying “definite meaning irrespective of interpretation or 
application”.114 However, this is not possible:  
All that one can see is that law reformers on occasion find it convenient, 
presumably in the interest of economy and efficiency, to adopt a pre-existing 
form of words, which may happen to have been formulated outside of the 
jurisdiction within which they operate—not unlike the way writers on occasion 
find it convenient to quote from other authors some of whom will be 
foreigners.115 
 
Hence, the transplanted Roman or French rules to which Watson refers have been 
interpreted differently in different societies and systems, which makes them different 
rules that the original ones, according to Legrand.116  
Legrand also analyses legal transplants theory from a political point of view, as he finds 
that this theory can be a useful political instrument for some. Additionally, the theory 
of legal change through legal transplant is superficial, according to Legrand, and it 
serves to “marginalize difference and correlatively to extol sameness”.117 Thus, the 
proponents of Watson’s theory focus only on the technical level of the law, and this 
creates “a false consensus which can only be established through exclusive reference to 
the formalized elements of the object under discussion and through the delegitimation 
of a notion such as ‘tradition’ or culture which, in its intricacy, would intervene as an 
irrational interloper interfering with the production and the perception of empirical 
regularity”, as Legrand notes.118 Thus, according to him, law does not exist outside a 
cultural context: “statutes are drafted by individuals, by human beings. Judicial 
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decisions are written by women and men who were educated somewhere, who learned 
to think about the law over there rather than over here. The same argument goes for 
textbooks, monographs, and articles”.119 
Legrand and Watson are the typical representatives of two streams of research, Watson 
being the formalist and Legrand adopting the culturist perspective. However, as noted 
by J.F Morin, “Most authors fall between these formalist and culturalist perspectives, 
recognizing that transplanted rules are likely to be interpreted, applied and enforced 
differently in the adopting legal system”.120 
1.3.3 Legal Borrowing and Legal Formants: Rodolfo Sacco  
In his articles on legal formants, Rodolfo Sacco begins by elaborating on whether the 
study of comparative law should be considered efficient only if it results in legal 
borrowing or in practical uses. According to the author, comparative law, like any other 
science, should have as an aim “the acquisition of knowledge”.121 
Sacco observes that it is not appropriate to make a comparison when speaking about 
legal rules in a given country, because regulations on the same topic can be given on 
different levels, from the constitutional to the statutory, or with court rules and judicial 
interpretations or with scholars’ opinions.122 Thus, “if we are then to compare the rules 
of the Italian legal system with those of the English system, which rule are we to 
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compare? The constitutional rule, the statutory rule or the judicial rule?”123 In this 
regard, comparison must recognize the existence of different “legal formants” within a 
given legal system, and these are not always uniform: they “may or may not be in 
harmony with each other”.124 
According to Sacco, legal formant methodology focuses on law as a social activity, 
while formant in this sense can represent a group or a community involved in the 
activity in which we are interested. According to this theory and methodology, the law 
must be always deconstructed in order to allow us to go beyond even the legal tradition 
discourse. In order to find out what a given legal system is like, we must not only look 
at the court decisions in a country, or at its statutes and laws, but to “all those formative 
elements that make any given rule of law amidst statutes, general propositions, 
particular definitions, reasons, holdings, etc.”125 
In Sacco’s opinion, in contrast to Watson’s, throughout history the legislators who 
introduced Roman law and changed local rules did so because of their lack of 
knowledge, since the Roman rules were the only ones they knew, not because they had 
previously compared the two systems. In the case of the spread of French law, Sacco 
states that this was the outcome of the “propagation of liberal ideas, the ideal 
codification and the prestige of all that was French”.126 The borrowing could take place 
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“because of the desire to appropriate the work of others. The desire arises because this 
work has a quality one can only describe as prestige”.127 
Thus, according to Sacco, the knowledge of these legal systems, which had to exist to 
some extent in order for them to be introduced and diffused, is not equivalent to the 
study of comparative law. This is explained through many cases in which legislators 
introduced borrowed rules without knowing how to apply them.128 Nonetheless, Sacco 
acknowledges the existence of legal borrowing, pointing out that legal borrowing is of 
central importance when it comes to understanding legal change.  
French Civil Code has found very many imitators: for example, the 
Piedmonteses with their Codice Albertino, the Neapolitans with their Codice 
Borbonico, many Swiss cantons, the Dutch, the people of Baden, the Poles in 
the period of Dutchy of Warsaw, the Russians at the time of Svod Zakonov 
(1832), then, in second wave of imitations, the Romaniana, the Bulgarians, 
Turks (with the Mecelle of 1968), the Egyptians, and through imitation of 1948 
Egyptian Code, the Somalis (1973), the Algerians (1975), and many others. 
Again, nineteenth century German doctrine has spread to Scandinavia, Russia, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Spain, Latin America and 
Holland.129 
 
Nevertheless, Sacco does not deny that the study of comparative law can contribute to 
achieving uniformity among different legal systems, in a situation “in which law is 
declared to be uniform before the content of the law has been established”.130 As an 
example, he writes about the supranational law at the European Economic Community 
level. In this case, comparative law has made possible the creation of uniformity, as the 
judges of the Court of Justice have created a judge-made law that has been inspired by 
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the laws of different legal systems within the community, only later to be replaced by 
the uniform law.131 
According to Sacco, comparative law is also helpful when it comes to imitating foreign 
legal models, though he acknowledges that the translation of legal linguistic 
expressions is one of the main problems of comparative law.132 
On the causes of legal imitation, Sacco writes that these are mainly drawn by the 
similarities in “cultural, environmental, social and economic conditions”,133 as the 
system that borrows must integrate the borrowed rule with its other rules. On the other 
hand, legal imitations are usually caused by imposition or prestige.134 According to 
Sacco, the imposition of legal rules has happened rarely throughout history, and 
imitation has been mainly caused by the prestige. “Today, it is unlikely that a European 
country will imitate an African model, that the United States will imitate a Venezuelan 
model, that the Scandinavian countries will imitate Italian model, and so forth.”135 In 
fact, it is more likely that the more economically developed countries will innovate in 
their legal rules, just like they will innovate in economic matters, while less developed 
countries will try to catch up and thus will be borrow. 
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1.3.4 Legal Irritants: Gunther Teubner  
“Good faith is irritating British law” is the phrase that introduces the work of Gunther 
Teubner and begins his paper on legal irritants.  
Teubner described the effect of legal transplants when, in 1994, the European 
Consumer Protection Directive transplanted the continental principle of bona fides into 
British contract law. Teubner points out that prior to the introduction of the EU 
Directive, the notion of good faith in performance and enforcement of contracts had 
been rejected several times, including by court opinion.136 
The transplantation of the bona fides principle started a debate among scholars on 
whether the good faith principle will be rejected or will “function as a successful 
transplant interacting productively with other elements in the legal organism”.137  
Teubner, on the other hand, has decided to use the metaphor of a “legal irritant”, as he 
believes it better describes the situation. This is because, according to Teubner, if we 
speak about legal transplants, this would mean that legal institutions can be moved 
easily from one context to another. As this is not the case, the metaphor of legal 
transplants is misleading.138 The metaphor of legal transplants create a false impression 
that the foreign instrument will play the same, identical role in the new environment. 
On the contrary, however, the foreign instrument “works as a fundamental irritation 
which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events. It irritates, of course, the 
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minds and emotions of tradition-bound lawyers; but in a deeper sense—and this is the 
core of my thesis—it irritates law’s ‘binding arrangements’”.139 
It is unclear what the effect of a legal rule that has been borrowed will be, according to 
Teubner, since on its path and during the adaptation the law touches and irritates other 
social systems, thus making the effect evolutionary and causing unexpected 
dynamics.140 
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Chapter II LEGAL TRANSPLANTS IN LABOUR LAW  
Some scholars state that labour law and regulation were imposed in numerous cases 
during the colonial period, and that many of the colonized countries have decided to 
keep this labour law regulation even in the post-colonial period.141 Tekle states that “it 
is important to take into consideration that, in many developing countries the labour 
law has existed as a ‘transplanted’ law…More generally, the legal system of countries 
of the North remained the major reference”.142 
For example, during the colonial period, as noted by Fenwick et al., the development of 
trade unions was usually restricted or strictly controlled due to the colonial policies that 
established strict control over the indigenous labour force.143 In the case of southern 
Africa, during the post-colonial period and prior to economic liberalization and 
democratization, “states…retained labour law systems imposed during the colonial 
period. Like their predecessors, many of the post-colonial states imposed tight 
restrictions on trade unions and industrial action that amounted to efforts to redefine the 
role of trade unions”.144 In East Asian states, the post-colonial period was characterized 
by labour laws that would prevent challenges to the state’s economic policies, while in 
the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia labour laws were transplanted from former 
colonial rulers.145 In some cases, like that of Malaysia, “the repressive labour and 
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industrial laws inherited from the colonial period and enhanced by successive post-
independence Malaysian governments are still largely in force”.146 
As Jentsch states, “Historical and evolutionary institutional theories link the emergence 
of and changes in institutions and practices of employment relations with developments 
in society and the nation-state at large”.147 Therefore, labour law and employment 
relations are often developed in parallel with the development of a country, since, by 
influencing the economic system, they were also shaping the path of development of 
the country itself. 
In the past four decades, there has been a global increase in the interest over labour law 
regulation as the primary tool and source for regulating business and for the creation of 
a suitable environment for the development of a free-market economy.148 According to 
this view, the new (or borrowed) norms in labour law and the way in which they are 
enforced and implemented will eventually shape the economic system of a country and 
its labour market.  
Besides different state and non-state actors, international financial institutions (IFIs) are 
very relevant and active players in this regard. As I will show in this chapter, IFIs have 
often considered too much labour law regulation as a burden to labour market 
development. For example, some of these institutions describe “labour law as a source 
of rigidity for the market and as an obstacle for creation of employment. Consistent 
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with this thinking deregulation and the flexibilization of labour relations has been part 
of the policy package that IFIs have recommended to developing countries, often as a 
condition to aid”.149  
As I will demonstrate below, IFIs have adopted a formalist approach to legal reforms, 
by relying on Watson’s methodology and one of the legal origins of La Porta et al., 
described further below.150 
2.1 Legal transplants and labour law in light of law and 
economics  
 
Weber considered economic factors important, but not the most important factor, in the 
process of shaping of European legal institutions.151 What he called a precondition for 
the creation of capitalism was a rational legal system,152 and he drew this conclusion 
from a comparison between Western Europe’s industrialized countries and non-
industrialized countries. In his analysis, Weber was always “deeply concerned with the 
interaction between legal and socio political structures and the institutions they 
produced”.153 Trubek observed that according to Weber the main difference between 
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the two types of countries was not only a “rational legal system” but also the 
“Protestant work ethics”. 154 
 In his analysis of Weber’s work, Trubek noted that:  
The failure of other civilizations to develop rational law helped explain why 
only in Europe modern, industrial capitalism could arise. Weber believed that 
this type of capitalism required a legal order with a relatively high degree of 
“rationality.” Since such a system was unique to the West, the comparative 
study of legal systems helped answer Weber’s basic question about the causes 
of the rise of capitalism in Europe.155  
 
Besides, Weber “realized the potential tension between a ‘rational’ legal system (one 
that generates stable expectations) and the need for legal adaptation within a rapidly 
developing economy, but he never fully resolved this tension in his work”.156 
Rationality of the legal system, according to Weber, derived from a system’s 
“autonomous, universal and consciously constructed character”.157 According to 
Douglas North, it is the quality of institutions that contributes to the difference between 
rich and poor countries.158 Thus, similarly to Weber’s rational legal system, “North sees 
institutions as playing a role in economic development”.159  
In the 1990s, scholars160 followed up on Weber’s and North’s rational systems theories 
and developed the idea that, depending on legal origin, some legal systems have a 
greater probability of being effective in supporting economic growth. They investigated 
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the legal foundations of economic growth161 and classified the legal indicators of forty-
nine countries according to their legal origin,162 using the following map of legal 
systems: English common law, civil law and three subdivisions of the civil law system, 
German, Scandinavian and French civil law.163  
In this classification, the country’s legal indicators in relation to the quality of 
shareholder and creditor rights protection were compared against economic outcome 
variables.164 The results of the research found that English common law systems 
arrange for better protection and are more efficient from an economic point of view, in 
particular as compared to the French civil law systems. 165 La Porta et al. observed that: 
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor 
protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law 
enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply 
to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have 
both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, 
especially as compared to common law countries.166 
The theory was originally applied to finance law and economics, only later to be used 
also with laws that regulate the labour market—thus labour law and in particular laws 
dealing with provisions on hiring and firing workers.  
Some reasons for why the legal origins theory found common law more supportive of 
economic-oriented outcomes are given by Shleifer and Glaiser,167 who found that 
“twelfth-century England’s weak central control and powerful local interests led to the 
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emergence of a jury system insulated adjunction from powerful local magnates, laying 
the foundation for courts as institutions that protect private interest, in particular, 
private property rights”.168 In contrast in France at that period the courts were under the 
control of the Crown, and “the courts therefore tended to serve the monarch’s interests 
and were less inclined to serve the interests of private individuals”.169 Finally, as 
support for the legal origins theory, these two scholars state: “One area where this 
greater insecurity of property rights in the civil law countries shows up clearly is the 
development of financial markets”.170  
Other scholars find explanations in the public choice theories and the “political 
channel” reality: “Common law systems, because of their support for judicial 
independence and the power of the courts to control the exercise of executive power, 
provide fewer opportunities for rent-seeking than systems of the civil law which look to 
legislation and codification to provide legal solutions, and thereby avoid disruptive 
distributional conflicts.”171 According to Hayek,172 “the common law trumps the civil 
law because courts are better suited than legislatures to continuously adapt rules to the 
needs of market participants”.173 
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2.2 Labour law reforms and international financial institutions 
As mentioned previously, IFIs such as World Bank base their advisory work on legal 
reform on the research performed by scholars, including those mentioned above and 
others, who linked law and economic outcomes. The legal origins theory was very 
useful for the World Bank, which, based on the theory, “established a database that 
assigns a numerical indicator to each country for a host of institutions ranging from 
shareholder and creditor rights to labour protections, operation of courts and so on”.174 
As Milhaupt and Pistor note: “New findings concerning the relation between law and 
market development are quickly reported as economic laws of nature in World Bank 
publications.”175 The importance of this becomes evident when we know that “the 
World Bank’s Doing Business report, which evaluates laws, including labour law, in 
the light of their economic efficiency, is one of the most powerful tools through which 
this conception of labour law has been promoted”.176 By the promotion of labour law 
here, we can also consider the promotion of labour law reforms.  
According to the World Bank’s  Doing Business report, the less regulated the labour 
market of a country is, the higher that country will be on the WB’s scale for doing 
business, as less regulation means better conditions for business and more employment 
creation. As found by Fenwick et al., one of the WB’s Doing Business reports from 
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2008 stated that “laws created to protect workers often hurt them – especially women, 
youth and unskilled workers”.177 
As illustrated by Supiot,178 in the case of the World Bank, “under this conception the 
law is virtually viewed as a product in a global market of norms, where a sort of natural 
selection is operated that sacrifices those laws that are not adapted to the need of the 
market”.179 As Tekle notes, the danger, among others, is that “protections (to the 
workers) can be reduced in this name”.180 
Edwards observes that where the World Bank was the donor of the laws to third world 
countries, no meaningful consultations or research have been carried out in order to 
investigate the compatibility of these legal transplants with the countries’ social and 
cultural realities. He states, “The results were dismal proving that the transplant of laws 
is rarely successful if the political and social environments of the donor and give rise to 
culture and values, which do not readily receive such laws. 181 
He further summarizes the process that happens when a third world country approaches 
the World Bank as follows: 
(1) Potential host is in economic crisis, e.g. balance of payment deficit, and is 
without the resources to restructure the economy; (2) Potential host approaches 
high interest international lending agency for a loan and over time interest 
accumulates and potential host economic situation worsens; (3) Potential host, 
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in a very low bargaining position, then approaches the World Bank for a loan; 
(4) World Bank agrees to lend a sum for structural adjustment and after 
conducting a comparative study or based on previous studies concludes that a 
certain economic policy would improve the economic situation of the potential 
host; (5) the loan is disbursed under the conditions that certain policies are to be 
implemented; (6) local laws are changed to accommodate the conditions 
(realisation of transplants); and finally (7) host reacts to changes in law 
(rejection or success).182 
 
Besides the World Bank, other international institutions “promote standardized legal 
reforms to further economic development”.183 These reforms necessarily touch upon 
the country’s labour regulation and industrial relations, in almost all cases while their 
technical approach to the legal reform is mostly formalist, often underestimating the 
fact that law is not a “politically neutral endowment”184 but rather a “product of human 
interaction”.185  
According to Siedman, the kind of interventions that rely upon Watsons’ understanding 
of legal transplants and the theory of La Posta are called a “Big Bang strategy”. He 
explains it as follows:   
The Big Bang strategy rests on neoclassical economics’ explicit premise that 
markets work basically the same way everywhere. The same laws can work in 
any market economy. In that model, institutions constitute a ‘black box’ which 
require no analysis. Neoclassical economic theory, therefore, seems to imply 
that if everyone simply pursues their own interests, mirabile dictum, there will 
emerge the optimal social allocation of goods and resources. In principle, 
therefore, to draft laws for a Big Bang transformation requires no examination 
of a country’s specific institutional context.186 
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What “Bing Bang strategy” and Watson’s theory lack, as well noted by Edwards, is the 
socio-political and cultural aspect in which law is operating and in which it has been 
enforced, and this is crucial for predicting the behaviour of legal transplants in the 
system. Besides, once introduced, legal transplants, in Big Bang strategy’s or Watson’s 
sense, produce immense challenges for the institutional system of the country. 
In this respect, the position of the World Bank regarding the economic success of legal 
systems also leaves some room for a more adaptive approach, in which institutional 
idiosyncrasies are taken into account. Indeed, the World Bank 2005 report on economic 
growth and reforms suggests that “the solutions must be found in specific-country 
context, rather than applied from blueprints, those who advise or finance developing 
countries will need more humility in their approaches, implying more openness on the 
range of solutions possible, more empathy with the country’s perspective, and more 
inquisitiveness in assessing the costs and benefits of different possible solutions”.187 
2.2 Law and economics and critique of the legal origins theory  
In line with what has been stated previously, I present in Appendix I the table 
developed by Milhaut and Pistor.188 These two scholars, in order to check the accuracy 
of the legal origins theory, examined data from the year 1870 to the year 2000 from the 
countries belonging to common law systems and civil law systems (with German, 
French and Scandinavian subgroups). Their research found that the origin of the legal 
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system has “poor predictive power with respect to high and low rate of economic 
growth for a large sample of countries over long periods of time”.189 
According to Milhaut and Pistor, most of the empirical evidence showing a positive 
causal nexus between common law systems and economic growth in the legal origins 
theory is flawed, due to the fact that it only considers quite recent time periods, either 
from the 1990s onward, or in some cases from the 1960s to the present. In contrast, in 
their analysis they adopt a much broader perspective and analyse the long-term 
relationship between types of legal systems and economic growth using data on GDP 
growth spanning from 1870 up to 2000. The table showing their analysis is in 
Appendix I.  
In order to increase the precision of their analysis, they distinguish between four 
different time periods: the years preceding the First World War, the period from the 
First World War to 1950, the years of the economic boom up until the first oil crisis in 
1973, and the subsequent years until 2000. They implement multivariate regression 
analysis to statistically analyse the relationship between the average rate of GDP 
growth in each country (in each period identified) and their specific legal system, 
distinguishing between common law and several types of civil law, according to their 
legal origin.  
The results show that in each of the four periods considered, the difference in economic 
growth rate between common law countries and other countries with a civil law system 
is never statistically significant, meaning that there is no evidence of a higher rate of 
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growth among common law countries, regardless of the period considered. Quite on the 
contrary, when the authors distinguish between the different legal origins of the civil 
law countries, they find that in each historical period considered there is at least one 
group of civil law countries that performed better than common law countries. In the 
period 1913-1950, the GDP growth rate of civil law countries with Scandinavian legal 
origins was significantly higher (in statistical terms) than common law countries; in the 
economic boom period (1950-1973), civil law countries with German legal origin 
showed a substantially higher rate of GDP growth, as showed by the statistical 
significance of the coefficient in the regressions. Such a higher growth rate of GDP in 
civil law countries with German origin also held during the last and most recent 
historical period analysed by Milhaut and Pistor.  
While these analyses do not control for a number of other important factors that might 
influence both the rate of economic growth and the type of legal system, leading to 
possible spurious relationships, the results still provide strong evidence that the 
commonly assumed correlation between common law systems and higher economic 
efficiency is not to be considered as a stylized fact in economic and legal theory. 
Instead, the opposite seems to hold true: in each and every historical period since 1870, 
other legal systems have been associated with better economic performances, with 
respect to common law systems.  
Milhaut and Pistor support their empirical findings with further case studies that also 
show how countries with underdeveloped legal systems can still experience very high 
rates of economic growth. The most typical example of this is China, where in recent 
years a legal system that was not able to secure property and contract rights was indeed 
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able to lead the country towards a sustained rate of growth in the last decade. Together 
with their empirical evidence, Milhaut and Pistor suggest that in most cases the level of 
development of the legal system does not seem to be a fundamental prerequisite for 
countries to achieve economic efficiency and higher rates of growth. 
Nevertheless, the economic analysis of law appears to be a useful tool, and in fact, 
legislators are often worried that the legislation should not impose higher costs for 
doing business, with respect to competitor countries. For these reasons, in line with the 
suggestions of many IFIs, it is often believed that implementing new legal norms with 
higher economic efficiency will foster the recovery and development of the country’s 
economy through the creation of efficient economic systems.  
An additional factor that supports the idea that legal regulations must ensure efficient 
economic outcomes is globalization. According to Garoupa and Ogus,  
A major step forward was taken with the hypothesis that competition between 
the suppliers of legal rules will significantly influence the evolution of law. If 
domestic industries competing in international markets find that their national 
legal system imposes on them higher costs than those incurred by foreign 
competitors operating under a different jurisdiction, they will apply pressure on 
their lawmakers to reduce the costs.190  
 
In other words, if the lawmakers do not reduce the cost, companies might adopt off-
shoring or outsourcing strategies to move to countries where legal systems impose 
lower costs. As a consequence, this may lead to strong pressure on policymakers and 
regulators to decrease such costs. 
Moreover, some scholars also argue that:  
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without harmonization (of legal rules), businesses selling their product in 
different jurisdictions incur ‘information costs’ and greater ‘litigation costs’ 
because they need to determine what laws apply in individual jurisdictions; they 
incur ‘inconsistency costs’ because they may need to abide with many different 
governance rules; and they incur losses from ‘legal instability’ when the law of 
a foreign jurisdiction applicable to their contract suddenly changes.191 
That law supports economic activities of course has its foundation in reality, as 
“markets are essentially made of relationships”192 while “laws help manage the 
relationships in a variety of ways”, including relationships created in the labour market, 
and which are creating the labour market itself and the country’s economy.193  
However, laws are not only useful for the management of market-based relationships 
with regard to the economic system. Milhaupt and Pistore elaborate on different roles 
that law has in this regard, such as how, in support of the economic system, the law 
plays not only a protective role but also that of coordination.194 A useful example in 
this respect is the German co-determination195 regime known as Mitbestimmung, which 
allows the workers of a company to elect their representatives:  
By mandating employee representation on the supervisory board, which 
appoints the management board, the law forces shareholders and management 
to bargain with employees over corporate strategies, not merely specific 
measures that might affect employees at their workplace…the critical point is 
that the design of legal system can be used to reflect social and political 
preferences for collective bargaining and coordination as opposed to 
individualized rights enforcement.196 
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Evidently, as pointed out by Milhaupt and Pistor, in the case described above the law 
plays the role of coordinator of actors’ behaviour, in this specific case related to the 
economic activity at the firm or enterprise level. However, at the same time, in this 
particular case the law plays also a protective role by protecting the workers from the 
arbitrariness or self-will of the employer or management. By allowing workers to 
organize at the firm level and take part in collective bargaining, the chances for the 
employer to abuse its power are reduced. Additionally this kind of regulation 
contributes to the creation of a more balanced correlation of powers in firms or 
enterprises, which altogether contribute to the creation of a more balanced economic 
system, or one that is more sustainable from a societal point of view.  
Besides the role of coordination and protection, according to Milhaupt and Pistor, law 
also supports economic activities “by playing auxiliary roles such as signalling and 
credibility-enhancement”.197 Regarding signalling, “law not only helps set the rules by 
which market activity takes place, but it also makes a larger statement about 
governmental priorities, the future direction of policy, the relative strength of interest 
groups concerned with a specific issues, and other information that may be useful to the 
market actors”.198  
On the other hand, credibility enhancement ensures effective governance and reduces 
the costs of what would be the consequences of governance that is not effective. As 
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Maxilield and Scheinder put it, “credibility in this context means that capitalists believe 
what state actors say and then act accordingly”.199  
In summary, according to Milhaupt and Pistor there are four functions that law 
performs in support of economic activity: protection, coordination, signalling and 
enhancing credibility.  
Nonetheless, Djankov and Ramalho found that the World Bank stated that “developing 
countries with rigid labour regulation tend to have larger informal sectors and higher 
unemployment, especially among young workers”.200 Commenting on the World Bank 
attitude, Deakin observes that, “It is assumed here that the basic economic model of the 
employment contract, in which powers of direction are reserved to the employer and a 
competitive labour market ensures an equilibrium between supply and demand, is an 
efficient one, which regulatory intervention will mostly likely undermine”.201 
One of the major examples of IFIs’ interventions is the privatization and market 
liberalization processes in Latin America after the economic crisis in the early 1980s. 
Prior to 1980, Latin American governments played a major role with respect to the pace 
of industrialization and the functioning of the internal markets.202 In this pre-
liberalization period, “The state would take active steps to raise industrial wages, while 
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subsidizing and protecting national industry, thereby creating an environment that was 
conducive to the protection of the wage earners”.203 
The arrival of the financial crisis in the early 1980’s and the subsequent intervention of 
IFIs (in particular the International Monetary Fund) brought as the main consequences 
trade liberalization and privatization and the progressive reduction of state intervention, 
i.e., deregulation. This eventually attracted foreign direct investment and created an 
environment able to attract capital flows. However, the reform also led to “the 
extension of precarious employment – for some the feminization of employment – and 
the exclusion of groups of workers from the social protection”. 204  
Although these policies allowed the economies of Latin American countries to recover 
from the economic crises and led to a sustained rate of growth during the nineties, the 
market deregulation policies contributed only to a limited extent to the creation of new 
jobs in the formal economy.  
These by-products of the policies implemented in the 80s also had long-term 
consequences: in 2005 Latin America “was the second largest world region in terms of 
the average size of the informal economy after sub Saharan Africa”.205 Today, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) reports that “more than half of the world’s 
workforce is estimated to be trapped in the informal economy”,206 and as Fenwick, 
Howe and Marchall note, “the persistence of informal employment, and the fact that 
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most workers are not covered by formal labour regulation, might be thought reasons to 
pause to wonder whether formal labour regulation is really the issue.”207  
The Latin American example shows that an interpretation of law that only considers it 
as a necessary support for the implementation of free-market mechanisms might not 
necessarily lead to satisfactory results, especially for what concerns employment 
outcomes and the protection of workers’ rights. This is especially relevant in economies 
in transition. This occurs because the support for deregulation and reduced state 
intervention as the best support for economic systems is not always backed by strong 
empirical evidence. Market failures are a typical example of the shortcomings of 
neoliberal economic thought. The markets are not always able to allocate resources 
efficiently: whenever externalities, information asymmetries or opportunistic 
behaviours emerge the markets may not be the best mechanism to allocate the factors 
of production, and may often lead to non-Pareto-efficient outcomes. In all of these 
cases, the legal framework should not be conceived as a simple prerequisite for the 
efficient working of market forces, but rather at least as a counterbalance able to 
remedy market inefficiencies. 
Besides market failures, another factor that might undermine the efficiency of policies 
that strongly rely on the ability of markets to self-regulate is the fact that markets are 
always in constant evolution, “typically because of the introduction of new 
technologies, the ability of new entrants to participate in the labour market, or the need 
for new rules to govern market conduct”.208 
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Market failures and information asymmetries can also strongly undermine the 
efficiency of labour markets. Information costs and signalling problems often reduce 
the ability of demand (the employers) and supply (the workers) to reach a satisfactory 
level of job matching, that is, to increase the probability that suitable candidates are 
hired for the appropriate job positions. Whenever labour law reforms are implemented, 
such relevant inefficiencies of the markets should be kept in mind.  
Another important prerequisite for the application of economics to law-related 
problems consists of the assumption of the rationality of actors. According to such an 
assumption, i.e., that individuals can rank alternatives on the basis of their preferences 
and pick the one that they prefer on the basis of the available possibilities, “A rational 
consumer should choose the best alternative that the constraints allow”.209 
However, as shown by Kahneman and Tversky, the fundamental assumptions of 
rational choice theory can be violated in some specific environments. They found that 
“The modern theory of decision making under risk emerged from a logical analysis of 
games of chance rather than from a psychological analysis of risk and value. The theory 
was conceived as a normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a 
description of the behavior of real people”.210 Therefore, in this case the application of 
economic models to evaluate the efficiency of legal systems might also have some 
important flaws.   
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It would seem that in the labour market, and in particular with regard to employment 
relations in free market economies, labour relations should mainly deal with the 
balance between the owners of the capital and the workers. As described by Collins, 
Ewing and McColgan  
From a political perspective the employment relation lies at the centre of a 
fundamental conflict of interest that is intrinsic to capitalist societies. The 
conflict lies between the owners of capital, who invest in productive activities, 
and the workers, who supply the necessary labour. Employers seek to maximise 
the return on their investments, whereas the workers seek the highest price 
available for their labour, which digs into the employer’s profits. As in other 
contractual relations, however, the parties ultimately share a common interest in 
the successful achievement of production and profits through the combination 
of capital and labour.211 
 
Finally, as pointed out by Freedland and Kountouris, the priority of policymakers who 
opt for an economics perspective to law is “for labour law interventions to ensure or at 
least not to undermine the competitiveness of the employing enterprises which are 
subject to those interventions”.212 
2.3 Sir Otto Kahn-Freund  
One of the leading labour law scholars, Sir Otto Kahn Freund was the first scholar to 
give a comprehensive picture of English labour law. He provided a philosophical 
approach to English labour law by applying knowledge from the German industrial 
relations system to it, bearing in mind the particularities of the English law system. For 
this current research, his work is important because he was one of the first scholars to 
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highlight the difference between the law and practice in labour law, pointing out the 
capacities of the enforcing institutions to implement the law in certain cases.  
Besides this, in the field of labour law Kahn-Freund’s work on legal transplants is of 
utmost importance. He considered that there are three degrees of transferability of law, 
and that the chances for the success of a legal transplant depend on geographical, 
economic, social and political factors.213 However the influence of these factors will 
vary, depending on the country’s context:  
the degree to which any rule, say on accident liability or on the protection of the 
accused in criminal proceedings, or any institution, say a type of matrimonial 
property or of commercial corporation or of local government, can be 
transplanted, its distance from the organic and from the mechanical end of the 
continuum still depends to some extent on the geographical and sociological 
factors mentioned by Montesquieu, but especially in the developed and 
industrialized world to a very greatly diminished extent.214 
 
According to him political factors and political structures are the most important 
elements when it comes to transferability of law.215 In addition to this, how strongly 
legal institutions are connected with society is also one of the main factors in 
determining the possibility of legal transplant.216 Kahn-Freund asked what the writings 
of Montesquieu on cultural diversities would have been had he lived in the twentieth 
century:  
Would Montesquieu have written about cultural diversities the way he did, had 
he been able to anticipate that everywhere people read the same kind of 
newspaper every morning, look at the same kind of television pictures every 
night, and worship the same kind of film stars and football teams everywhere? 
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Industrialisation, urbanisation, and the development of communications have 
greatly reduced the environmental obstacles to legal transplantation-and nothing 
has contributed more to this than the greater ease with which people move from 
place to place.217 
 
In his writings Kahn-Freund welcomes the tendency of “foreign influences” on law, 
subject to some limitations, and states that there are three possibilities when this kind of 
influence should be considered. The first possibility aims at “preparing the international 
unification of the law, secondly, with the object of giving adequate legal effect to a 
social change shared by the foreign country with one’s own country, and thirdly, with 
the object of promoting at home a social change which foreign law is designed either to 
express or to produce”.218 
The work of Kahn-Freund was inspired and influenced by the work of his professor, 
Hugo Sinzheimer, who “constructed” the Weimar labour legislation in Germany. 
Sinzheimer, and later his student Kahn-Freund, considered that lawyers must not study 
only formal legal rules but also the link between legal philosophy and legal beliefs, on 
the one hand, and social and economic powers on the other. However, in contrast to 
Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund was more critical of the “Weimar judiciary and policies of 
state intervention”.219 The fact that he witnessed the birth of the Nazi state left a 
footprint on his philosophical thinking on state interventionism in law, and this was 
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reflected in his analysis of labour law in England. Through his life he considered that 
“the undermining of collective institutions, contributed to the rise of Nazism”.220 
Kahn-Freund identified collectivism with the principle of collective labour law, as 
noted by Dukes,221 and he observed that  
The socio-political system of collectivism is characterized by a particular 
attitude of the state towards the class struggle. The legal system does not negate 
the class struggle or suppress it, but it does not allow it unlimited freedom; it 
rather attempts, within the framework of the capitalist system, to determine the 
way it is conducted by the establishment of legal norms and, over and above 
this, to utilise the results of each individual stage of conflict for the further 
development of the law.222 
 
Hence he advocated for the state’s limited intervention when it comes to collective 
bargaining between employers’ and workers’ unions, with an idea that “the state would 
allow the trade unions and employers’ associations freedom to regulate social policy 
through the autonomous negotiation of collective agreements, and would give its 
support to that regulation by guaranteeing the agreements’ ‘compulsory normative 
effect’”.223  
As observed by Dukes, Kahn-Freund believed that if the state intervened in the 
bargaining between employers and workers’ for its own interests, this would be the 
opposite of the principle of collectivism.224 When they are free from state intervention, 
the collective agreements have a greater ability to adapt and evolve in order to meet 
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changing economic and industrial realities, as noted by Deakin.225 The role of the state 
in regulating collective bargaining would be to make this bargaining possible and free 
from state intervention.  
To his writings on collective laissez-faire, Kahn-Freund applied his thoughts on 
transplanting laws. Consequently, in the “1950s, Kahn-Freund re-evaluated parts of this 
early work, rejecting the method of applying German law principles straightforwardly 
to English circumstances. It was then that he developed the notion of collective laissez-
faire, highlighting and explaining the particularities of the British system”. 226 
After noting that the law in England plays a minor role in regulating labour relations 
when compared to Germany,227 Kahn-Freund observed that “There is, perhaps, no 
major country in the world in which the law has played a less significant role in the 
shaping of these relations than in Great Britain and in which to-day the law and the 
legal profession have less to do with labour relations”.228 Accordingly, he noted that in 
contrast to Weimar Germany, “no legal rule existed in the UK which rendered the 
terms of collective agreements legally binding as a matter of course”.229 In fact, he 
wrote that collective agreements in England “are intended to yield ‘rights’ and ‘duties’, 
but not in the legal sense; they are intended, as it is sometimes put, to be ‘binding in 
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honour’ only, or (which amounts to very much the same thing) to be enforceable 
through social sanctions but not through legal sanctions”.230 He observed that:  
the presence of unions successfully redressed the power imbalance between 
workers and employers…that workers’ rights were more secure if they were 
acquired through collective bargaining rather than through constitutional or 
legislative guarantees…that collective laissez-faire was more flexible than 
legislation because it allowed unions and employers to decide things for 
themselves and to respond to changing circumstances.231 
 
As a consequence, some scholars point out that Kahn-Freund was faced with the 
paradox of having to observe in England “one of the best developed systems of 
voluntary collective bargaining”232 on the one hand, and on the other no statutory 
regulation linking the collective bargaining to the employment relationship and its legal 
construction.233 
In fact, Kahn-Freund was aware of the low level of employment protection legislation 
in national regulation,234 and it has been observed by some that his final aim was the 
integration of collective bargaining and workers’ protection regulation in the standard 
employment contract.235 Employment protection legislation embraced the employment 
contract as the foundation for the regulation of the individual employment relationship 
in England in the 1970s.236  
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In this regard, one of the Kahn-Freund’s hypotheses was that the statutory provisions 
on employment protection were not well integrated with the common law in England. 
Thus, what is suggested in the literature is that Kahn-Freund was not only concerned 
with the regulation of an employment contract, but was also concerned that once the 
contract of employment was regulated it was not certain that the institutions would be 
efficient in enforcing it.237 This idea was expressed in one of his last writings, 
Blackstone’s Neglected Child: The Contract of Employment (1977), in which he wrote 
about the “integration variable” and Blackstone’s “failure to treat the contract of 
employment as the general foundation of the service relation”238 and how he was 
“intellectually helpless in the face of legislation, unable to see statute law and common 
law as a whole”.239  
With the politics of economic deregulation and liberalization in the 1970s in England, 
labour law was used “not as a means of achieving distributive goals or embodying a 
notion of industrial justice, but as a part of an economic policy designed to foster 
competitiveness”.240 Some scholars suggest that the disintegrated vision of the statutes 
on employment protection legislation and common law practice was in fact what made 
the deregulation policy quicker and stronger. As put forward by Freedland:  
But might we not have predicted that the political impulses of recent years 
towards deregulating the employment relationship and dismantling the standard 
employment contract would assert themselves more quickly and more strongly 
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in labour law systems under which there had been a less integrated vision of the 
standard employment contract in the first place?241  
 
2.4 Role of International Labour Law  
The role of international labour law is important in shaping labour markets throughout 
the world, as it sets up the minimum standards that should be respected and adapted in 
accordance with national circumstances when regulating labour relations.  
International labour law is composed of a corpus of international labour standards 
(ILS), conventions and recommendations, which as international regulatory 
mechanisms of labour relations and human rights in the world of work are adopted by 
the member states of the ILO. Prior to the adoption at the state level, all conventions 
and recommendations this organization adopts need to be agreed upon among the 
representatives of workers and employers organizations and those of the governments 
and adopted by two-thirds of votes of the representatives. This reflects the policy of the 
organization, that is, to promote balanced labour markets and social dialogue among its 
tripartite constituents in the world of work-related policies.  
It was one of the stepping-stones for workers’ rights globally when in 1944 the ILO 
Declaration of Philadelphia proclaimed that labour is not a commodity,242 meaning that 
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people should be treated with dignity and respect and not as a capital. This approach 
also underlines the human rights dimension of workers’ treatment in employment and 
occupation, and is fundamentally opposed to the approach according to which “labour 
is simply a unit of production, to be bought and sold, and with a market value”.243  
Social dialogue and tripartism, which are among the core values of the ILO, are also 
being promoted within the member states as key policy instruments for regulating the 
labour market. This means that the organization promotes in its member countries 
dialogue between the representative organizations of employers and workers (bipartite) 
or, at the state level, between the representative organizations of employers, workers 
and the state (tripartite) over the world of work-related issues; here, among other issues, 
are included labour and employment law-related reforms. The social dialogue approach 
is also promoted and guaranteed by several ILO instruments, of which the most 
important are the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 
1976 (No. 144); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
(No. 98); and Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87). Additionally, Conventions No. 98 and No. 87 provide the 
guarantee of one of the four fundamental or core labour rights—freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining in the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.    
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The core labour rights must be respected by the ILO member states even if the country 
in question did not ratify the relevant convention. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work states in article 2 that:  
…all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have 
an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to 
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the 
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those Conventions, namely:  
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and  
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.244 
 
Although the International Labour Conference (ILC) discussed the subject of 
employment relationships in 1997, 1998 and 2003, the agreement to vote for a 
convention on this topic has never been reached. Instead, in 2006 the Conference voted 
on a Recommendation on Employment Relationship, No. 198 (R198).  
As noted in the Guide on R198, in the years prior to the adoption of the 
recommendation, and probably the reason why the discussion at the ILC ended with a 
non-binding international instrument, “The issue of who is or is not in an employment 
relationship – and what rights/protections flow from that status – has become 
problematic in recent decades as a result of major changes in work organization and the 
adequacy of legal regulation in adapting to those changes”.245 
In addition, and as noted in the Guide, there is disagreement among member states with 
regard to situations in which “(1) the respective rights and obligations of the parties 
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concerned are not clear, or where (2) there has been an attempt to disguise the 
employment relationship, or where (3) inadequacies or gaps exist in the legal 
framework, or in its interpretation or application.”246  
R198 sets out in paragraph 2 that “The nature and extent of protection given to workers 
in an employment relationship should be defined by national law or practice, or both, 
taking into account relevant international labour standards”, while “National policy 
should be formulated and implemented in accordance with national law and practice in 
consultation with the most representative organizations of employers and workers”.247  
Therefore, R198 leaves to the member countries how to define the nature and extent of 
the protection, though it limits this freedom with the minimum protections that are set 
in the international labour standards. It also states that the policy should reflect the 
consensus the state shall try to reach when negotiating with most representative 
workers’ and employers’ organizations.  
What is also interesting is that R198 calls for states to provide “for a legal presumption 
that an employment relationship exists where one or more relevant indicators is 
present”.248 As far as the specific indicators are concerned for the determination of an 
employment relationship, the Recommendation suggests that these should be defined in 
the national laws and regulations and suggest the following in article 13:  
(a) the fact that the work: is carried out according to the instructions and under 
the control of another party; involves the integration of the worker in the 
organization of the enterprise; is performed solely or mainly for the benefit of 
another person; must be carried out personally by the worker; is carried out 
within specific working hours or at a workplace specified or agreed by the party 
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requesting the work; is of a particular duration and has a certain continuity; 
requires the worker's availability; or involves the provision of tools, materials 
and machinery by the party requesting the work; 
(b) periodic payment of remuneration to the worker; the fact that such 
remuneration constitutes the worker's sole or principal source of income; 
provision of payment in kind, such as food, lodging or transport; recognition of 
entitlements such as weekly rest and annual holidays; payment by the party 
requesting the work for travel undertaken by the worker in order to carry out the 
work; or absence of financial risk for the worker.249 
 
Although it represents a non-binding legal document, the relevance of R198 is 
recognized by the national courts of many countries, and when lacking national 
regulation they sometimes decide to call upon this recommendation in their court 
decisions. This happens most often with cases that concern the determination of the 
existence of an employment relationship.  
In the court decision of Brazil’s Regional Labour Tribunal of the Third Region from 30 
September 2003, in determining the existence of an employment relationship in the 
case of a worker in a cooperative,250 the judge referred to Recommendation 198 and 
quoted paragraph 8(b): “Ensure that cooperatives are not set up for, or used for, non-
compliance with labour law or used to establish disguised employment relationships, 
and combat pseudo cooperatives violating workers’ rights, by ensuring that labour 
legislation is applied in all enterprises”.251 
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The Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago, in the case of Insurance and General 
Workers’ Union v. Tri-Star Latin-America Ltd., South West Regional Health 
Authority, Tobago Regional Health Authority of 23 January 2007,  referred to 
paragraph 9 of R193, which reads as follows: “…the determination of the existence of 
such a relationship should be guided primarily by the facts relating to the performance 
of work and the remuneration of the worker, notwithstanding how the relationship is 
characterized in any contrary arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that may have 
been agreed between the parties”.252 
Besides the influence of international labour standards on countries’ labour law 
regulation, as described above, the International Labour Organization’s technical 
experts provide technical comments on draft labour law-related regulation when called 
upon by the tripartite constituents. The aim of this kind of support is to provide 
assistance to the member states to draft legislation that is in line with ILS and also best 
practices. Thus, the experts provide their technical comments both in light of ILS and 
in light of best comparative practices. In this regard, Employment Relationship 
Recommendation 198, together with the ILO Convention on Termination of 
Employment No. 158, represent the two most relevant instruments from the point of 
view of ILS, when the aim of the reform is to introduce in legislation flexible forms of 
work.  
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In addition, some countries have decided to directly transplant the conventions or their 
articles into national legislation. Australia, for example, directly transposed the ILO 
Convention on Termination of Employment No. 158 into its country’s legislation.253 
Apart from the ILO’s technical intervention in labour law reforms, the ILO influences 
the world of work regulation through its direct supervisory system on the application of 
conventions and recommendations ratified by member states, called the ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR). CEACR represents a sort of monitoring mechanism for the ILO, which 
should eventually ensure that all ratified conventions and the ILO core conventions are 
actually enforced within the member states through legislation and/or in practice. The 
comments of this committee on the application of ratified conventions for all member 
states are available online.  
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Chapter III CONSTRUCTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP AND CASE STUDY OF 
MONTENEGRO 
 
In the previous chapter I showed that an internationally recognized regulation of the 
employment relationship exists and, although not binding—since it was voted on in the 
form of a recommendation—it can still represent a source of guiding principles when 
setting up the minimum standards for protecting and covering all workers who are in 
some kind of employment relationship.  It was also stated that regulation of an attempt 
to disguising an employment relationship is a point of disagreement among different 
labour market actors of different countries.   
When it comes to the practice of disguising an employment relationship, certain groups 
of workers are more vulnerable than others, however it has been acknowledged that 
workers in the informal economy are recognized as among the most vulnerable. Some 
scholars point out that in this informal relationship, the worker and employer “share an 
unwritten understanding about pay, hours, work quality, working conditions, job 
security, and other dimensions of employment”.254  
There are different views on why the informality happens. The one according to which 
the cost of the design and enforcement of the employment contract is seen as a major 
reason for the informality255 has been debated by scholars who are not in favour of the 
deregulation of the labour market. They showed that, as we saw in the case of Latin 
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America, this kind of practice, while making the employment contract less “expensive” 
to design and enforce, does not necessarily lead to the opening of new jobs in the 
formal economy. 
 
Moreover, as stated by Fenwick, Howe and Marshall, “If treated unfairly by their 
employers, informal employees usually have no recourse to the courts, because their 
employment relationships are rarely documented.”256 As stressed in the statement 
above, the fact that it is not documented does not mean that the employment 
relationship does not exist. In this thesis I will resort to the reasoning according to 
which as long as there is a relationship of work being performed in return for 
remuneration, an employment relationship exists. 
In order to protect workers from possible abuses and to balance the relationship of 
power on the side of the employers and the workers, many labour laws do not provide 
for an explicit provision according to which the contract of employment should or 
should not be in written or in oral form, nor do they provide a provision according to 
which the employment relationship is based on a contract of employment. For example, 
article 4 of the Employment Relationship Act of Slovenia states that  
1) An employment relationship is a relationship between the worker and the 
employer, whereby the worker is voluntarily included in the employer's 
organised working process, in which he in return for remuneration continuously 
carries out work in person according to the instructions and under the control of 
the employer.257 
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In fact, in many former Yugoslavian countries, the factual working relationship, or the 
act of performing work for pay, is that which determines the existence of an 
employment relationship, as I will show later.  Similarly, French jurisprudence, for 
example, considers that “the existence of an employment relationship depends on 
neither on the expressed intention of the parties nor on the denomination which they 
have given to their agreement but on the factual conditions in which the activity of 
workers in question takes place”.258  
On the other hand, in order to know which legal rights are given to this category of 
society, i.e., workers, identification of who is a worker and their coverage in national 
legislation can be of a great importance.259 Certainly in different countries labour laws 
provide for different definitions of the term “worker” or the term “employee”, and 
depending on the broadness or narrowness of this definition certain categories of 
workers can be included or excluded from the scope of the law’s application. 
Sometimes these excluded types of workers may be covered by other special laws, e.g., 
public servants, military staff, police officers, etc., while some are not recognized by 
the law at all although they do exist in practice, e.g., home workers, domestic workers, 
and the self-employed.  
According to Tekle, the traditional coverage of labour law protection was more related 
to a man as a worker: “the head of a household without childcare responsibilities”.260 
This statement, however, can be challenged, as it does not fully hold ground in the 
countries that previously had a socialist establishment, as there, for example, the state 
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would usually ensure childcare facilities for everyone—which would make a difference 
for a working woman. In fact, in the countries whose economies are in the process of 
transition from a centralized economy towards a labour market economy, the changes 
in labour market institutions and regulations have modified the working life of women, 
with the ultimate effect of creating an additional burden upon them. In the pre-
transition era, women performed long hours of unpaid work at home in addition to their 
paid contribution in the labour market, and this dual role had an important effect on 
women’s labour market opportunities. But, during the transition process, the labour 
market has changed from a very formal one heavily centred on public employment to 
one that is extremely polarized. At the same time, the burden of parental duties, 
especially childcare, has been transferred more and more away from the state and onto 
the household. As a consequence, new duties for women have arisen. They have to 
rethink and be innovative in their life decisions, such as how much to invest in 
education and when to start a family. As Gosh noted,  
We have thus observed, in the space of less than one generation, massive shifts 
of women’s labour into the paid workforce, especially in export oriented 
employment and then the subsequent ejection of older women and even younger 
counterparts, into more fragile and insecure forms of employment, or even back 
to unpaid house-work. Women have moved—voluntarily or forcibly—in search 
of work across countries and regions, more than ever before”.261 
 
The employment relationship cannot be observed and studied outside of the categories 
that determine it, some of which are mentioned above.  
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In this chapter I will present views on the regulation of the employment relationship 
and try to introduce this very broad topic in law, and will finally present the case study 
of Montenegro. In this country, due to labour law transplants that occurred as a 
consequence of the political will for the creation of a new legal and economic system, 
the form of the employment relationship has undergone changes in the last decades. 
3.1 Regulating the employment relationship   
Regulation of the employment relationship takes different forms and has a different 
scope of application in different countries, although some scholars seem to agree that 
the contract of employment is a typical way of its regulation.262 However, there are 
scholars who consider the employment contract to be the expression of unequal 
bargaining power on the side of workers and employers or “that a contractual 
framework obscures more than the inequality of bargaining power between the parties 
– it also obscures the proprietary basis of the exchange”.263  
Because of employment contract’s main characteristics, some consider that classical 
Roman law, locatio conductio operarum and locatio conductio operis, can be found as 
a predecessor of the employment contract in civil law jurisdictions.264 In the Roman 
period, however, work in exchange for money was not considered as an honorary 
occupation, since in this manner free people would be equalized with slaves.265 This 
attitude changed in the Middle Ages. Here in the preindustrial society the employment 
relationship developed in the circumstances of the closed economy and patriarchal 
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society.266 As explained by Kovačeivic and also by Deakin, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century the principle of subordination was still in the heart of the employment 
contract.267 This was a “sort of counterbalance of the employers’ responsibility for the 
risks at work, as well as the risks related to the occupational safety and health, security 
of income and security of employment.”268 
While the principle of subordination in the contract of employment was supported by a 
number of regulations in European countries, in 1900 the term “contract of 
employment” was mentioned for the first time, in the Belgian law on an employment 
contract from 1900,269 then in France in a law from 18 July 1901, then in the 
Netherlands in a law from 13 July 1907. Switzerland regulated the employment 
contract for the first time in a law from 30 March 1911270; it was then regulated in Italy 
with laws from 1907 and 1924, in Germany in laws from 1913 and 1919, in Denmark 
in a law from 1921,271 and in old Yugoslavia, under the term “service contract”, in a 
law from 9 November 1932, No 262 – LXXXI in article 207. 272  
However, in the civil law systems there were differences in regulation of the 
employment relationship between French and German systems of origin. As well put 
by Deakin, 
In systems coming under French influence, the law assumed that the state had 
the power to regulate basic conditions of work. The idea of ordre public social 
signified a set of mandatory conditions written into the employment 
relationship. The law, in recognizing the employer’s unilateral powers of 
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direction and control within the organisational structure of the enterprise, also 
undertook the responsibility for protecting the individual worker; the employee 
was thereby placed in a position of ‘juridical subordination’.273 
 
In contrast to this, 
In systems influenced by the German code, the contractual character of the 
employment relationship was qualified by a ‘communitarian’ conception of the 
enterprise. The German law concept of the ‘personal subordination’ of the 
worker implied their ‘factual adhesion to the enterprise’ (‘Tatbestand’), a 
process conferring upon the individual ‘a status equivalent to membership of a 
community.’274 
 
As already shown in the second chapter of this thesis, the individual employment 
relationship in England was developed only in the 1970s with the development of 
employment protection legislation. And as stated by Collins, Ewing and McColgan, 
“compared to other European countries, the common law of contract developed by the 
judges accorded almost complete flexibility, subject only to the restraint of trade 
doctrine and general rules against enforcement of illegal contracts”.275 
What is common to however to these two legal systems is that with the development of 
the modern employment relationship the terms of the contract began to reflect in some 
way the essentiality of the “mutuality of obligation, namely the promise to perform 
work in return for a promise to pay wages”.276,277  
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In different countries, however, legislators responded differently to framing the 
employment relationship. As noted by Mummé, “In some countries, for example, 
employment is primarily regulated through specific legal regimes which either impose 
terms, rights and obligations between the parties, or create processes and procedures for 
collective bargaining of employment rights and responsibilities”.278 On the other hand, 
“in other countries, such as the United States, Canada, and England, a core contractual 
common law model of employment law occupies a central regulatory role, which is 
supplemented by various statutory regimes which are not highly integrated with that 
common law model”.279  
Throughout the course of history labour law underwent changes and reforms as the 
system of production changed in countries and at the global level, and also with the 
rising awareness of human rights and international labour standards which form part of 
them. This affected and had its consequences on the creation and regulation of the 
employment relationship.  
Freedland and Kountouris note that changes in the regulation of the employment 
relationship in different national legal systems and in different contexts of the legal 
system itself have left consequences on the character of the regulation.280 They observe 
that: 
in a legal system where personal work relations in general or at least some kinds 
of personal work relations have, over time, been the subject of extensive and 
multifaceted regulations, there will have been many different acts of legal 
construction of those regulations – many exercises in linking legal character 
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with legal consequences – each taking place in its own regulatory context and 
constituting its own micro system.281  
 
The micro systems to which Freedland and Kountouris refer are created because of the 
reforms on this topic in law that occurred over time in many European systems282: “it 
therefore further follows that the legal construction of personal work relations will have 
resulted in the formation of a great multiplicity of micro-systems existing in a great 
multiplicity of regulatory contexts”.283  
This approach can be related to Sacco’s view that is incorrect to assume the unity of 
legal rules within a given legal system.284 As Sacco noted, it is not the case that “in a 
given country at a given moment the rule contained in the constitution or in legislation, 
the rule formulated by scholars, the rule declared by courts, and the rule actually 
enforced by courts, have an identical content and are therefore the same”.285 Therefore 
it also follows that the employment relationship is composed of the legal formants as a 
basic architecture.286 
As previously mentioned, there are scholars who consider that path dependence of law 
can determine the success or the failure of a legal transplant. Hence the law regulating 
the employment relationship is also path dependent.287 As stated by Freedland and 
Kountouris,  
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the legal construction of contract of employment as giving rise to obligations of 
mutual trust and confidence was also path-dependent upon a certain set of 
developments in the concept of “constructive dismissal” which were occurring 
in the context of the law of unfair dismissal – so this crucial development of the 
sub-system of labour law which we think of as “the law of the contract of 
employment” was heavily dependent on the contemporaneous emergence of a 
new subsystem of “the law of unfair dismissal”, those two subsystems being 
considerably but far from completely interesting ones.288 
 
Path dependency in this regard means that the employment relationship in legal 
analysis is also dependent on institutions, their settings and their behaviour—having in 
mind here the institutions that govern and regulate the labour market.289 Freedland and 
Kountorous state that “the legal analysis of personal work relations in a given legal 
system will tend to have been shaped and determined, to a greater extent than is 
generally understood to be the case, by the operation of practices or ways of thinking 
which have institutional standing and are embedded in labour market structures and in 
the legal system itself”.290  
This also means that the enforcers of the law, as much as the legislators, shape the path 
dependency of an employment relationship and all the rights and duties that derive 
from it, as in fact they also do create the influences in the path in all legal systems. The 
problem arises when there is a high degree of disharmony between the legislative and 
institutional support for the regulation, and this of course affects the shaping of the 
subject matter in law.  
On a similar note, as I discussed in the part dedicated to Otto Kahn-Freund and noted in 
his analysis and later writings, he was concerned that there is a disharmony between the 
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law and practice on the contract of employment in England. The importance of the 
tribunals in this regard will be noted in the part of the thesis that examines the case 
study of the employment relationship in Montenegro.  
Among different countries and legal systems, the regulation of the labour market and 
industrial relations differs. This is why also transplanting laws in these contexts is 
sensitive and usually their full adaptation takes time. As noted by Levine and Ohtsu: 
Industrial relations analysts have long recognized the complexities of labor 
relations. They involve large numbers of interrelated rules and customs placed 
into effect, often after protracted negotiations, by employers, workers and their 
unions, and government bodies under the influence of dynamically changing 
economic, technological, political, and social constraints. It is not likely that a 
practice plucked out of context from one country will readily fit in another. The 
likelihood is even less when the practice is shorthand for a whole set of 
interrelated behaviors.291 
 
On a similar note, Freedland and Kounouris point out that every legal system has its 
own ordering of the sources of regulation, while “that distinctive approach forms an 
identifying characteristic and formative part of its system of labour law within a 
national legal system as a whole”.292 For example, in civil law systems we may say 
that, in contrast to the English system, countries structures the labour law sources 
according to a strict vertical hierarchy of sources.  
In Germany, Italy, France, and Spain, the regulation of the contract of 
employment is defined by an orderly cascade of collectively agreed norms, 
statutory rules, and constitutional principles, on the basis of the general 
principle that every level of regulation below is only able to derogate in melius 
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– that is to say, broadly speaking, in a more worker-protective fashion – from 
the level above.293  
 
In civil law countries in Europe, the constitution is generally the main and primary 
source of regulation, follow by the labour law, and then acts, statutes and collective 
agreements at different levels. Normally, in this case, collective agreements cannot 
provide fewer rights then what is stipulated in the law, and law cannot provide fewer 
right compared to the constitution. However, there are differences in the civil law 
system in the regulation among different countries on the “aspects of formation, 
content, performance, and termination (of employment)”.294 In contrast to the 
continental European systems, in England, as pointed out previously, “the statute, 
collective bargaining, and the contract of employment as shaped by common law 
reasoning have traditionally been far less integrated than in continental European 
systems”.295 
However, it is possible to find some mutual patterns in all systems,296 and this is also 
one of the principles of the ILO’s work, which consists in, among other, global 
standard setting for the work related regulation.297 In line with this, Freedland and 
Kountouris argue that examining the sources of labour law regulation in a national 
context can help us understand and can affect our understanding on the regulation of 
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the employment relationship and they try to group these sources, for all legal 
systems.298  
They propose the following sources of employment law for civil and common law 
systems in Europe299:  
1. Norms that appear to be agreed upon by worker and employer, or the business; 
however these are typically imposed by the business or industry, and can be 
regarded as an internal regulation of a firm.  
2. Norms that are the result of collective bargaining between workers’ and 
employers’ organizations, at any level of operation, and which can constitute a 
collective agreement. 
3. Norms as outcomes of national legal systems, at any level on the hierarchy list 
of regulation. 
4. Norms that derive from supra-national legal systems such as the EU or the ILO. 
5. Norms as the result of jurisprudence, case or judge-made law.  
6. Norms as the result of legal treatises or doctrines in the continental Europe. 
3.2. Case study of Montenegro  
In this section I will present the case study of Montenegro, where, starting in 1990, the 
creation of an employment relationship also introduced the contract of employment. 
Moreover, the change in the regulation of the employment relationship was 
accompanied by a broader change in the regulation in general of the labour market and 
its institutions and mechanisms.  
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It should be noted that as one of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro 
had the same or similar regulation with regard to employment and labour as all other 
former Yugoslavian countries while being part of the Yugoslavia. In the Yugoslavian 
system there was the presumption that the employment relationship exists, that is to say 
that with the act of factual employment one creates an employment relationship.300 This 
is an important point, since this presumption still currently exists in the Montenegrin 
system. 
In the period before 1990, and until the new forms of employment emerged and were 
regulated, any form of employment relationship—with regard to the most important 
rights—was considered the same in law and in practice. Here in particular the emphasis 
is on the most important rights deriving from the social security system, such as 
pensions, healthcare and unemployment insurance.301 Thus, in the former Yugoslavian 
system, the rights to social security were an integral part of the rights based on labour 
relations.302 Therefore the act of employment was related to social security and by 
common sense to the employment relationship as well.303 
3.2.1 The establishment of the employment relationship in Montenegro 
 
It is worth mentioning, however, that the countries that formed Yugoslavia in 1918 had 
their own legal traditions, customs and laws. In these countries prior to 1918, labour 
relations were regulated by civil codes (Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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Dalmatia, Slovenia and Istria, Croatia, Slavonia and Serbia),304 and besides these also 
with commercial laws, mining laws and laws on activities.305  
In Montenegro however, prior to 1918, there was no specific regulation of the contract 
of employment, though some regulation of labour relations existed as previously 
mentioned, in the General Property Law (Opsti Imovinski Zakonik) from 1988306 and 
in the Commercial Law from 1910 (Trkovacki zakonik). The 1910 Commercial Law of 
Montenegro, among others, established that merchants are the people whose primary 
or, as the law states, “usual” occupation is commerce (article 1 of the law). In order to 
engage in this activity, the law required that persons must be of an adult age (21 years 
old). The law also prohibited women from working without their husband's permission. 
Relying on article 638 of the General Property Law, the Commercial Code further 
states that boys and girls may trade (from the age of 18 years), but require the 
permission of the father or the guardian, and in both cases the approval of a competent 
court is required (article 2). The Commercial Code also talks about the registration of 
companies, ordering the mandatory application of the company (article 5). 
The regulation of workers’ protection and insurance was established (only for one part 
of the Montenegrin territory) when in 1918 Montenegro become part of the Kingdom 
of Serbian, Croats and Slovenians. In that period the constitution of Serbia was 
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enforced in Montenegro together with all Serbian laws, which included, among others, 
the Serbian Law on Actions from 1910.307  
It is important to note that some of the articles of the 1910 Law on Actions clearly 
show that, prior to 1957, the employment relationship was being developed like in most 
other European civil law counters and was on a path that would eventually create the 
labour market, which protects the private property. For example, the 1910 law 
regulated the “supporting staff” (pomoćno osoblje) and, as interpreted by Milenkovic, 
the legislator here had in mind all labour forces employed in the private sector.308  
The employment relationship, according to the 1910 law, was based on a written 
contract of employment, normally with a duration of one-year, and the law also 
contained articles on the termination of employment at the initiative of the employer or 
the worker.309 The law prohibited night work for women and in general the work of 
men younger than 18, and it also regulated the maximum duration of working time.310 
The protection of women and the regulation of working hours arrived later, but still it 
represented the clear influence that regulation in England had on continental European 
regulations. In England, for example, the working time of women and children was first 
regulated in 1804, and the first law on the minimum age for employment was created in 
1816, while in France the minimum age for employment was regulated later, only in 
1841, and in Germany in 1939.311 
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The process of creating unified laws for the whole territory of Yugoslavia began in 
1921, with the Law on Labour Inspection from 1921, the Law on Workers’ Protection 
from 1922 and the Law on Workers’ Insurance from 1922.312 In 1931 the Law on 
Activities was passed, and it was in force in all Yugoslavian territory. The law from 
1931 was in force until the beginning of the creation of new type of socio-economic 
society and until the Law on Invalidity of the regulations passed before April 1941 was 
brought.  
3.2.2 The employment relationship in Yugoslavia during the socialist 
period 
 
The first post-war Yugoslavian Constitution from 1946 did not contain the article on 
the right to work, only on the obligation to work.313 It stated in article 33: “Every 
citizen has a duty to work in accordance with its abilities; who does not contribute to 
the community cannot receive from it”.314  
What followed was the: 
development of labour law which supports the concept of the self-governing 
socialism, thus a particular kind of socialism - a process that started in 1950 
with the Basic Law on Management in State Business Enterprises and Higher 
Enterprises by Work Collectives, and has been incentivized with the 
Constitutional Law on Basic Principles of Social and Political Structure of 
Yugoslavia and Federal Authorities, which formally guaranteed the right to 
work (and abandoned the principle of the obligation to work) – which had its 
influence on the Law on Labour Relations from 1957.315 
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The 1953 Constitutional Law transformed the Yugoslavian economy into a self-
governing society. The Yugoslavian Constitutions from 1963 and 1974 contained the 
articles on the right to work but not on the obligation to work.316  
In the years of socialism during Communist party rule in Yugoslavia, the development 
of labour relations, in line with civil law European countries’ practices at the time, as 
mentioned above, was abolished. However, in contrast to the USSR’s labour relations 
and labour relations of other socialist systems at the time, the socialist system of 
Yugoslavia was more moderate. One of the reasons for stating this is that, among other 
things, the contract of employment and collective agreements were not completely 
abandoned, but were however marginalized.317 Nevertheless, these individual 
employment contracts as well as the collective agreements did not contain all elements 
of the contract, but rather represented, as Brajic states, “orchestrated acts without full 
contract content, or completely without it”.318  
There were some other elements as well that made Yugoslavian socialist society 
different from other socialist countries. Some scholars point out that among all the 
reasons for this, the self-management model of Yugoslavian socialism was one of the 
main differences in this regard.319 Apart from this, Yugoslavia was also “an exception 
to this socialist world of full employment”320, or rather a socialist world that would not 
admit the existence of unemployment.  
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As Woodward puts it, “the leadership of the Communist party acknowledged officially 
in 1950 that unemployment could exist under socialism”.321 According to a theory 
developed in 1958 and accepted in the 1980s, the unemployment rate that existed at 
that time was due to the “country’s system of decision making and labour-managed 
firms (called worker self-management) (that) gave employed workers too much power 
over the share of net profiting going to wages”.322 Woodward provides the figures323 
for the unemployment rates in Yugoslavia from 1964 to 1972, which make a division 
between net rates (domestically unemployed only) and gross rates (both domestically 
unemployed and those registered as working abroad). The data show that while 
domestic unemployment remained quite stable throughout the years, the number of 
Yugoslavian citizens working abroad increased steadily in all these years. While on the 
one hand this seems to suggest the increasing, though hidden, role of unemployment in 
the Yugoslavian economy, on the other hand one should consider that it is not 
straightforward that all those people working abroad would necessarily have been 
unemployed in Yugoslavia. In some cases they might have chosen to work abroad 
because of higher salaries, for example.  
Another particularity of the Yugoslavian system is that with the Constitution from 
1974324 labour relations have been based on a conception of a “joint work” (udruzni 
rad). Prior to 1974, the Constitution from 1963 regulated the employment relations, 
“determining the unique socio-economic position of all working people.”325 Then in 
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1965 the Basic Law on Labour Relations introduced collaborative labour relations. 
Thus, this law created “the collaborative working relationship that is established 
between the workers themselves organized (joint work), so as an impartial relationship 
of workers who work together (they merge or join the work) and who self-manage 
socially owned property and receive the income on the basis of operating results”.326  
After the 1974 Constitution, the Law on Joint Work was passed in 1976, and it defined 
the employment relations as “relations among workers in basic organization, or 
working community, where workers, in exercising their right to work with social 
means, create in joint work with social means and determine by self-regulatory general 
acts which are the individual and collective rights, duties and responsibilities, in line 
with the Law.” 327  
It is clear, then, that the employment relationship was established among workers and 
not between the worker and the employer.328 Moreover, this employment relationship 
was established among the workers, who not only join their work in this collaborative 
working relations but also self-govern and determine rights, obligations and 
responsibilities.329  
Although one of the aims of the communist system was full employment (an aim of all 
political systems, after all), unemployment existed, and as previously shown, it was 
also acknowledged by the Communist Party at the time. However it was largely kept 
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under control because Yugoslavian nationals were allowed to travel and work in 
Western Europe.  
In the above-described conditions, from 1941 to 1989 the employment contract was, in 
practice, abandoned as a form and the employment relationship was formed in the 
public sector by decision (rješenje) until 1989. In contrast to the contract of 
employment, in the decision there was no formal requirement of consent on the part of 
the worker in the sense that it was not required for the form to be signed by the worker. 
Thus the legal basis for the establishment of the employment relationship was the 
decision of the self-governing body—the workers’ council—and “the chosen worker’s 
duty was to issue a statement before taking the position declaring that he or she is 
introduced with self-governing agreement on workers’ joint work”.330 The worker had 
the right to appeal in case he or she was not satisfied with the decision.  
The absence of the contract of employment was justified by the Communist Party’s 
position towards subordination in the employment relationship and in general with a 
view according to which the employment contract is a bourgeoisie instrument of the 
labour market. These were also the primary reasons for abolishing the employer’s role 
in this employment relationship. In reality, these acts helped the state to establish full 
control over its economy and production. 
 
 
                                                          
330Ibid. 
95 
 
3.2.3 The re-introduction of the employment contract in Montenegro 
 
The situation described above started to change in 1989 when the new Yugoslavian 
government passed the Law on Basic Rights from Labour Relations. In this period, 
with the change of the communist government, all Yugoslavian republics created their 
own labour legislation. 
The 1992 Constitution of Yugoslavia was based on a concept of market economy and it 
marks the starting of a period of transition from the self-governing socialist model of 
economy to the market-based one. Ficher et al. describe well the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia:  
At the time the transition began, there was thus little direct experience of the 
process of economic transformation, and those advising on and designing the 
reforms had to draw on general principles and related experiences--the lessons 
from structural reforms in developing countries in the 1980s and earlier, the 
experience of China since the late 1970s, and previous reform efforts in the 
transition economies themselves.331 
 
Up until the present date, a number of scholars have investigated the relationship 
between the failure of communism, the process of economic transition, the revolution 
of liberalism in Southeast Europe and the transformation of labour rights. Most of them 
agree that historical changes, wars and revolutions in economic systems contributed to 
the development of the quest for nationality in these countries, but also contributed to 
to the poor development of social rights, in particular of labour rights. 
In this environment labour legislation has changed constantly since 1992 with a view to 
modernizing it and adapting to the needs of the labour market, and mostly with the aim 
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of legal harmonization in the process of joining the European Union. Pistor et al. use 
the phrase “legislative tornado” to describe the amount of transplanted norms and legal 
reforms which occurred since 1990s.  
However some scholars point out at the unpreparedness of many actors advising on the 
reforms despite the fact that the transition which occurred at the time was not the first 
of its kind.  In fact, as noted by Pistor et al, the technical assistance with bringing new 
laws to Latin America, Africa and Asia was firstly launched after the II World War, by 
the US legal scholars.332 This first law and development movement was however then 
proclaimed to be a failure in 1974, by the main actors of the technical assistance 
process.333 Now in the 1990s there was again a need for the technical assistance in the 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. Pistor et al note that during this period, called 
by some the second law and development movement,  
This proved essentially a repetition of the first movement: legal experts, 
including scholars and practitioners, swarmed formerly socialist economies with 
constitutions, codes, statutes and regulations. This time advisors from the 
United States faced stronger competition from Western Europe in comparison 
with the first law and development movement. Proponents of the German or 
Dutch civil codes, Americal corporate law, European corporate law, 
harmonization directives… marketed the value of Western law to their 
counterparts in the East, backing their campaign to transplant their home legal 
system with financial aid promises and/or the prospect of joining the EU.334 
 
In the newly created situation, the contract of employment has returned as the main 
regulator of the employment relationship and with it the status of employers in the law 
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and practice. The new regulation, and in particular the emergence of the new forms of 
the contract of employment, based on the models of developed labour market 
economies, created constantly new situations to which all actors in the labour market 
had to adapt and act accordingly. Moreover the situations created as a result of new 
individual and collective labour regulation, have contributed to the establishment of 
trade unions and employers organizations, and emergence of social dialogue. In 
addition freedom of association has been granted at the constitutional level.  
Parallel to this the new labour law regulation, both collective and individual, which is 
constantly changing and adapting since 1990s, tends to create enabling conditions for 
the development, as previously mentioned, of the labour market economy, and also 
more flexible working relations. Yet, in the present conditions, some scholars point out 
that the rights of workers have been poorly protected and this is perhaps because the 
capacities of their representatives, trade unions, are not developed enough. According 
to Upchurch, there are structural and agency factors of contribution in the above 
mentioned sense. Structural factors that have contributed to the poorly developed 
capacities of trade unions are related to the political and economic goals of the ruling 
elite, which are related to the creation of a free market and the creation of enabling 
regulatory conditions that would support desirable outcomes. The influence of IFIs is 
another structural factor that can be considered in correlation with what has was written 
previously in Chapter II. Agency constraints, according to Upchurch, are ideology and 
past legacy.  
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Here is his explanation:  
Structural factors335 
State economic 
strategy 
“Neo-liberal orthodoxy pursued as State strategy has been 
invoked in an effort to clear out ‘rigidities’ in the new market 
economies. In its ‘shock therapy’ version, this has often meant an 
early collapse of many market inefficient organisations within the 
productive sector, and an emphasis on privatisation and labour 
market de-regulation. This has placed unions (read workers) in a 
very defensive position, arguing primarily for privatisation but 
with the retention of social safety nets.” 
International 
financial 
institution 
conditionality 
“Weak internal capital accumulation has entailed the enlisted 
support of international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, 
EBRD, USAID, etc.) in granting loans and grants. The attached 
‘conditionality’ reinforces market imperatives and negatively 
affects social welfare payments. Gowan refers to the ‘Faustian’ 
nature of the international financial institutions in re-casting 
economic and social priorities, while Gradev has labelled the IFIs 
as a ‘fourth actor’ in terms of their ability to shape and reform 
employment relations regimes in transformation states (Gowan, 
1995; Gradev, 2001). Upchurch (2006) refers in particular to the 
‘positive asymmetric power’ of the international financial 
institutions, under whose influence the interests of organised 
labour have been effectively excluded from the transformation 
process.” 
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Agency constraints on trade unions in transformation336 
 
Ideological 
fragmentation of 
unions 
“Trade unions have fragmented ideologically and politically 
under post-Communism, with the main division emerging 
between the old ‘official’ unions and newly independent 
unions (Smith and Thompson, 1992; Thirkell et al, 1998; 
Pollert, 1999). This has added to union weakness both in 
industrial and in political ways. Industrially, unions have not 
been able to present a united front to employers while, 
politically, they may align themselves with different and 
sometimes opposing political factions and parties.” 
Legacy of Communist 
past 
“Trade unions have been claimed to suffer from societal 
‘weakness’ due to negative legacy from the past, whereby 
popular trust in unions is constrained by their association with 
the old Communist regimes (Ost and Crowley, 2001). It is also 
recognised, however, that mistrust is apparent with other civil 
society organisations (Howard, 2003), and leads to problems 
of (re)creating effective ‘civil society’. Frege (2002) suggests 
that unions have sought alliances with employers (as they did 
under Communism) rather than develop autonomy and 
independence.” 
 
In this atmosphere, the transition process in Montenegro, had different effects on the 
actual reality, as among other, the capacities of institutions enforcing the constantly 
changing laws were weak in reply to these changes, which is to be expected. Pistor et al 
observe that:  
                                                          
336 Ibid. 
100 
 
“The most common complaint is that while the transplanted law in now on the 
books, the enforcement of these laws is quite ineffective. In fact empirical 
analysis suggests that there is little correlation between the level of legal 
protection afforded by statutes on the one hand and measures for the 
effectiveness of the legal institutions on the other”.337  
 
One of the major examples in this regard is related to the informal employment in the 
country. As the transition contributed to the development and expansion of the private 
sector, it has also contributed to the rise in informal employment. The data found by the 
ILO state that prior to the transition, the share of informal employment was at around 
5% of  GDP, while in 2010 it represented 22.6% of overall employment.338  
With the changing atmosphere of the labour market, the changing regulations and legal 
system and expansion of private business, the Montenegrin institutions also had to 
adapt in order to provide for the effective enforcement of the laws. As stated 
previously, during the period of the self-governing socialist system, the opinion of the 
courts and of the legislators was that there is a presumption of the existence of the 
employment relationship. This is also the case today, as the court is of the opinion that 
whenever there is a factual working relation, there also exists an employment 
relationship from the moment the worker started performing the job. This is also 
supported by the Labour Law, which states that:  
“If the employer with the employee fails to conclude a contract (of 
employment) in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, it is considered 
that the employee has an employment contract of indefinite duration, which 
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starts on the day of commencement of the work, if the employee accepts 
employment.”339  
Quite in contrast with the regulation, which explicitly considers any factual working 
relation as an employment contract and hence formally excludes informal types of 
work, with the development of the legal conditions for the expansion of the private 
sector, Montenegro experienced an increase in the level of informal employment.  
However, a rather peculiar feature of this recent phenomenon is that in the country 
there are no court rulings on the determination of the existence of the employment 
relationship for the cases in which the contract of employment does not exist, but the 
factual working relationship instead does exist.  
Therefore, as in the self-governing socialist period, the presumption of the existence of 
the employment relationship still exists, as long there is a factual working relationship. 
However, in reality such regulation has not prevented the increase of the number of 
disguised forms of working relationships, such as those without a contract of 
employment. In this new situation, although they were given legal instruments, the 
national courts were not able to apply them, thus creating a bypassed situation. 
This specific case provides a good example of what can possibly occur when legal 
institutions are not well connected with law. According to Kahn-Freund’s theory, this 
factor plays an important role in determining the successes of legal borrowing.340 The 
case of Montenegro shows that Kahn-Freund’s theory, according to which institutions 
may lack the intellectual capacities to apply the legislation of their own country (when 
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this is in contrast with common practice), is indeed relevant and should be taken into 
account whenever legal transplants are considered.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the development of the legal transplants theory 
and apply it to the labour law or more specifically to the creation of the employment 
relationship in the form of the contract of employment in Montenegro in 1990s.  
The study examined the development of the matter in Montenegro, in the light of legal 
transplants, which is a novelty in itself, as it represents the first study of this kind 
applied to the Montenegrin case. In the last chapter the analysis and the description 
focused on the historical period from 1888 until today and have discussed the readiness 
of institutions to adapt to the new models of regulation of the labour market. It has been 
presented that not only the legal institutional system in the country has changed through 
legal borrowing, but the legal borrowing had as a consequence a new political, legal 
and economic system in a country.  
I also provided an overview of legal transplants theories, and I have linked these with 
labour law-related regulation and labour market creation. The legal transplants theories 
are divided between scholars who are considered to be culturists, such as Legrand, and 
those who adopt a more formalistic approach to law, such as Watson. However, other 
scholars have also adopted a more moderate approach in between these two, such as 
Kahn-Freund, Mattei, Sacco, Graziadei, Teubner and others. Each one of these three 
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theoretical perspectives (culturist, formalist and those in between) brings quite different 
policy implications.   
Borrowing in labour law and labour law reforms in general are important both from a 
rights point of view and from an economic point of view, as they shape the socio-
economic realities of individuals and their families in a given system. The right balance 
between these two aspects should be found, without prescribing a one-fits-all solution.  
In order to be most effective in these two regards (social and economic) in the field of 
labour law, policymakers should not adopt a unilateral approach, as this is often the less 
sustainable one. On the contrary, policymakers should engage all relevant stakeholders 
of the labour market in the decision-making process. In this thesis I showed that the 
transition takes more time in the cases in which relevant non-state actors (employers’ 
organizations and trade unions) are weak. Thus an important conclusion is that the 
labour market should be governed by rules that are previously agreed upon by the 
representatives of its actors, workers, employers and state. Indeed, labour law is a 
particularly sensitive area, as it requires the coordination of different state and non-state 
actors in order to ensure the protection of rights, the balance of powers, industrial peace 
and economic efficiency and sustainability.  
In the thesis I also discussed the role of different supranational actors in regulating the 
labour market. It has been demonstrated that the perspective adopted by IFIs, according 
to which some general principles in labour regulations (such as deregulation) are 
always beneficial for all countries, can be considered as a good approximation of the 
formalist approach to legal reforms, based on Watson’s methodology and that of La 
Porta. On the contrary it is likely that among developed countries, institutions may be 
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better able to adjust and react in addressing market failures. Low and middle income 
countries, instead, when trying to introduce more “efficient” systems of production 
(through deregulation and privatization) in their institutional and legal systems, may 
not be able to act quickly and address the problems that typically occur when market 
failures emerge. As a consequence, the problems related to market failures and market 
changes might be relatively more relevant when free market-based reforms are 
introduced in these countries.  
The case study of Montenegro described in this thesis provides some interesting 
contributions to legal transplants theory in labour law. The first contribution consists of 
the acknowledgment that the law, and labour law in particular, is the product of human 
interaction and is not an isolated phenomenon. It is not possible to know in advance 
how much time it will take before the borrowed norms become part of institutional 
culture, but it is demonstrated that until this happens, no legal borrowing can be fully 
successful. This process of incorporation of the new norms in the institutional culture 
will be even more complicated if the changes in the legal and institutional settings 
occur very often. In Montenegro, the country’s labour regulation has experienced 
systematic and radical changes throughout the years: from the early development of a 
contract of employment in the 1910s, to its marginalization in the 1950s, to the 
establishment of the self-governing system in the 1960s and finally with the 
reintroduction of the employment contract in the early 1990’s. This process necessarily 
created a line of adverse effects and possibly confusion among the law and the 
implementing institutions. 
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In this respect, the Montenegro case study provides a new contribution to Kahn-
Freund’s original idea of the “integration variable”, concerning the intellectual 
capacities of the institutions to implement the law. The Montenegro case shows that 
Kahn-Freund’s theory can be applied not only to a common law country, but also to 
other countries, independently from its own legal system, whenever there is a gap 
between the law and the practice. A typical consequence of this gap is that institutions 
do not intervene even in the cases in which they are entitled to do so, because the new 
regulation is alien to them.  
The second contribution of this thesis is that in most cases less developed countries, 
and especially those with transition economies, do not intentionally innovate in legal 
rules, but rather try to catch up with more prestigious legal systems, which they usually 
take as a model no matter the degree of complementarity between the two systems. 
However, even if it may seem that tradition can affect only to a small degree the 
norm—at least the one that is written—on the contrary, this factor will affect to a large 
extent the actual application and enforcement of such norms and possibly their 
formulation, even if only the translation is in question.  
It is clear that in countries whose legal system collapses, the legislators and the law, as 
an outcome, are affected by politics during the process of reforms and transition. This 
is because the main driver of the change is indeed politics, which is trying to create a 
new socio-economic system, but first needs to create an enabling legal system. This 
scenario corresponds very closely to what has happened in the last twenty years in 
Montenegro.  
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However, even if politics represents the main driver of the change—thus it exists 
before the law is created in the form of the “will”—it is almost impossible to separate 
the politics from the people who are actually conducting it. The consequence is that 
these people are indeed still affected by the tradition and previous social norms in 
which they operated in past years.  
So the three forces—politics as a pressing factor for the creation of the law (the 
political will) on the one hand, and tradition and law on the other, as three social norms 
affecting our behaviour mentioned by Mattei—can also be in conflict within one given 
legal system or in a national context, because the people and the institutions enforcing 
the norms are under the influence of the environment that shaped them until that very 
moment. Eventually, this path dependency of norms is, among other, why transition 
takes time.  
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APPENDIX I Legal Origin and Economic Growth  
 
Table 1. Legal origins and economic growth 
Average annual per capita 
growth rate 
  1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2000 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2000 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
      
  
   Common law 
 
-0.00081 0.00036 -0.00585 0.01318 - - - - 
  
(0.00289) (0.00333) (0.00937) (0.00809) - - - - 
Civil law 
     
  
   English legal origin 
 
- - - - -  - - - 
French legal origin 
 
- - - - 0.000043 -0.00078 -0.00354 
-
0.02112*** 
      
(0.00313) (0.00319) (0.00863) (0.00762) 
German legal origin 
 
- - - - -0.00016 -0.00721 0.06187*** 0.03078** 
      
(0.00427) (0.00435) (0.01450) (0.01279) 
Scandinavian legal origin 
 
- - - - 0.00471 0.01403** 0.00645 -0.00670 
      
(0.00523) (0.00533) (0.01823) (0.01608) 
Constant 
 
0.01596*** 0.01292*** 0.05023*** 0.02267*** 0.01514*** 0.01328*** 0.04437*** 0.03585*** 
  
(0.00156) (0.00180) (0.00523) (0.00452) (0.00247) (0.00251) (0.00689) (0.00608) 
Observations 
 
48 48 77 77 48 48 77 77 
R2 
 
0.0017 0.0003 0.0052 0.0342 0.0202 0.2301 0.2397 0.2289 
Adjusted R2 
 
-0.0200 -0.0215 -0.0081 0.0213 -0.0466 0.1776 0.2085 0.1973 
F-test of overall significance   0.08 0.01 0.39 2.65 0.3 4.38*** 7.67*** 7.22*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Milhaupt, C.; Pistor, K. 2008. Law & Capitalism, University of Chicago Press, United States of America. 
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APPENDIX II341 Regional Labour Tribunal of the Third 
Region, Brazil 
 
Regional Labour Tribunal of the Third Region, Rogério Ferreira Gonçalves (1) Infocoop Servíços – 
Cooperativa de Profissionais de Prestação de Servíços Ltda (2) Caixa Económica Federal CEF  
(Responsável Subsidiária), 30 September 2003, 00652-2003-017-03-00-0RO 
 
Constitution of Brazil 
Article 5 
(1) Norms that define fundamental rights and guarantees are immediately applicable. 
(2) The rights and guarantees expressed in this Constitution do not exclude other rights stemming from 
the system and principles adopted by this text or stemming from international treaties to which the 
Federal Republic of Brazil is a party. 
(3) International treaties and conventions on individual rights that are adopted by both houses of the 
Congress, in two rounds, by three fifths of the votes of the members of each house will be the equivalent 
of constitutional amendments. 
Country:  
BRAZIL 
A worker carrying out his activity within the framework of a cooperative providing services for a public 
administration/ Claims of the existence of an employment relationship/ Existence of a link of 
subordination/ Reference to international law to strengthen a decision based on domestic law 
A computer operator had joined a cooperative which provided services for a public administration. 
Within that framework, he worked for the administration while being paid by the cooperative as a 
member of it. 
Collaboration with the cooperative ended after 20 months. The worker referred the matter to the courts in 
order to gain recognition that he was in fact linked to the cooperative by an employment relationship, a 
legal classification, leading to the granting of a certain number of advantages and compensations. 
                                                          
341 The summary of this Court’s decision has been taken from the website of the ITC ILO and the 
Compendium of Court Decisions, available at: http://compendium.itcilo.org/en  
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The court of first instance decided in favour of the operator and reclassified the contractual relationship 
linking him to the cooperative. The cooperative appealed that decision, arguing on the one hand that the 
operator was a full-fledged member of the cooperative, thus receiving his part of the benefits of that 
organization and stressing on the other hand that the contractual ties between the cooperative and the 
public administration were purely civil in nature, and that there was no evidence that there was a 
dependent employment relationship with the operator. 
Before examining the facts of the dispute, the Regional Labour Court considered the article of the 
Brazilian labour legislation indicating that the members of a cooperative are not tied to it by a contract of 
employment. The jurisdiction of second instance stressed that that provision had the sole result of 
creating a simple presumption of an absence of a dependent employment relationship and that it in no 
way prevented reclassification of the contractual tie linking the member to the cooperative, especially in 
the event of fraud aimed at avoiding the application of labour legislation. 
In order to strengthen its interpretation of the labour legislation mentioned above, the Regional Labour 
Court referred to ILO Recommendation No. 193 on the Promotion of Cooperatives. After having quoted 
paragraph 8(b) of that instrument,2 the Court said the following: “Thus, while promoting the creation of 
cooperatives, the ILO has shown its concern that that legal instrument not be used to violate workers’ 
rights. In each case, it is necessary to check the way in which the provision of services occurred in order 
to determine its correct legal qualification.” 
The Court of Appeal applied that principle to the case in hand and found that remuneration of the 
computer operator was absolutely no different from that usually paid to an employee and that nothing in 
the organization of the work done by the operator made it possible to consider him an independent 
worker. 
On that basis, the judge giving the Regional Labour Court’s decision declared: “Thus, basing my 
argument on the legal principles already mentioned as well as on the recommendation coming from the 
ILO and adopting the same position as the decision of first instance, I reach the conclusion of the 
existence of a relationship of employment, the conditions of Article 3 of the consolidated labour laws 
being fulfilled.” 
 
1 ILO Recommendation on Promotion of Cooperatives, 2002 (No. 193). 
2 Paragraph 8(b) of Recommendation No. 193: “Ensure that cooperatives are not set up for, or used for, 
non-compliance with labour law or used to establish disguised employment relationships, and combat 
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pseudo cooperatives violating workers’ rights, by ensuring that labour legislation is applied in all 
enterprises.” 
 
APPENDIX III342 Industrial Court Case, Trinidad and 
Tobago  
 
Industrial Court, Banking, Insurance and General Workers’ Union v. Tri-Star Latin-
America Ltd., South West Regional Health Authority, Tobago Regional Health 
Authority, 23 January 2007, Case No. 74 of 2002 
 
Country:  
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Triangular employment relationship/ Constructive dismissal/ Demotion/ Establishment of a 
jurisprudential principle based on international law  
The Banking, Insurance and General Workers’ Union, in name of Mr. Hazel, called on the Industrial 
Court to order the defendants to pay compensation to the worker for their constructive dismissal. The 
trade union based their arguments on the fact that the worker had been demoted without prior notice from 
the position of Team Leader in a Pilot Project with operation supervisory responsibilities to the one of 
Emergency Medical Technician, which also incurred a salary reduction that affected the worker’s living 
conditions. Following three years working in the new job, the worker resigned. 
Once the Court had reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties in the case, it concluded that none of 
the defendants’ evidence challenged the evidence submitted by the trade union to prove that there was no 
justification for the demotion and that the worker had not been afforded the opportunity to know the 
reasons behind the decision or defend himself against the decision. Moreover, there was no doubt that the 
worker had suffered a salary reduction and that the defendants’ actions were not in keeping with the 
principles and practices of good industrial relations practices established in the Industrial Relations Act. 
Based on the above, the Court declared the constructive dismissal to have been proved. 
The Court found that the only controversy in the case lay in the existence of an employment relationship 
between the worker and the defendants, since all of the enterprises involved denied having employed the 
worker. This point had to be resolved in accordance with Section 10 (3) (b) of the Industrial Relations 
Act, which establishes that the Court is required to act having regard to the principles and practices of 
good industrial relations. In this regard, the Court indicated that in so doing, ILO Recommendation No. 
                                                          
342 The summary of this Court’s decision has been taken from the website of the ITC ILO and the 
Compendium of Court Decisions, available at: http://compendium.itcilo.org/en 
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198 and other international and local precedents can be considered and applied to the circumstances of 
the case. 
The Court referred to paragraph 9 of ILO Recommendation No. 198 which establishes that: 
“the determination of the existence of such a relationship should be guided primarily by the facts relating 
to the performance of work and the remuneration of the worker, notwithstanding how the relationship is 
characterized in any contrary arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that may have been agreed between 
the parties.”3 
The Court also highlighted how recommended indicators of the existence of an employment relationship 
in Recommendation No. 198 are the periodic payment of the remuneration to the worker and the fact that 
such remuneration constitutes the sole or principal source of income. 
Considering all evidence submitted by the parties and “applying current principles of good [industrial] 
relations practices”, including those derived from Recommendation No. 198, it concluded that at the time 
of the demotion the enterprise that employed Mr. Hazel was Tri-Star Latin-America Ltd., and that this 
enterprise was the sole employer of the worker.  It, thus, ordered Tri-Star Latin-America Ltd to pay 
damages to the worker for constructive dismissal.  
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APPENDIX IV Gross and Net Unemployment Rates in 
Yugoslavia 
 
 
 
Source: Woodward, S. L. 1995. Socialist Unemployment, The Political Economy of 
Yugoslavia, 1945-1990, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
